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CALIFORNIA DREAMING: THE CALIFORNIA SECURE 
CHOICE RETIREMENT SAVINGS TRUST ACT  
 
EDWARD A. ZELINSKY* 
 
*** 
 
Half of American workers are not covered by employer-sponsored 
retirement arrangements.  The recently passed California Secure Choice 
Retirement Savings Trust Act seeks to solve this problem by mandating 
retirement savings arrangements for California employers, coupled with a 
public investment vehicle for investing these private retirement savings. 
The Act is important because of California’s size and status as a 
trendsetter for other states. 
 
This Article is the first to examine the important legal questions the Act 
raises under the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA.  Contrary to the 
drafters’ intent, the savings accounts authorized under the Act do not 
qualify as individual retirement accounts under the Code.  Hence, 
employees participating in savings arrangements established under the Act 
will not receive the income tax benefits associated with individual 
retirement accounts. 
 
If the Act were to be amended to make its accounts individual retirement 
accounts, the Act would survive ERISA preemption under New York State 
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 
514 U.S. 645 (1995), though not under Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 
U.S. 85 (1983).  Since Travelers is the Court’s more recent and more 
compelling construction of ERISA preemption, the Act should survive 
ERISA preemption if the Act is amended to have true individual retirement 
accounts. 
 
                                                         
* Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. For comments on prior 
drafts of this article, he thanks Professors Jonathan Barry Forman, Paul 
Secunda, and Norman Stein and Attorney Alvin D. Lurie. For research 
assistance, Professor Zelinsky thanks Richard Gove and Louise Loeb, both 
of the Cardozo Class of 2013, and Gulsah Senoh and John R. Doran of the 
Cardozo Class of 2014. 
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A final section of this article addresses the choices other state legislatures, 
as well as Congress, confront if they elect to follow part or all of the path 
on which California has embarked to encourage private retirement 
savings.  President Obama has recently proposed a federal mandate under 
which employers with more than ten employees would be required to 
maintain either retirement plans or IRA coverage.  The President’s 
proposal ensures public debate about the appropriate function of 
government in encouraging retirement savings.  The Golden State’s Act 
will play an important role in that debate.  In that debate, I favor state-by-
state experimentation rather than any single approach to the task of 
encouraging greater retirement savings. 
 
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 By signing the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust 
Act (“the Act”), Governor Edmund (“Jerry”) Brown, Jr. took an important 
step toward establishing a retirement savings mandate for Golden State 
employers, coupled with a public investment vehicle for private retirement 
savings.1 By simultaneously signing S.B. 923,2 Governor Brown 
guaranteed further debate about the Act and its provisions since S.B. 923 
requires an additional vote of the California legislature before the Act can 
be implemented.3 The Act represents the first tentative success of 
nationwide efforts to create state-sponsored private retirement programs.4 
                                                         
1 S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); see Laura Mahoney, California 
Governor Signs Bills to Create Pension Mandate for Private Employers, DAILY 
TAX REP. (BNA) No. 190, at H-2 (Oct. 2, 2012). 
2 S.B. 923, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); Mahoney, supra note 1. 
3 See S.B. 9232012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100043.5 to the 
CAL. GOV’T CODE (2013)). 
4 See Florence Olsen, California Leads, No State Has Green Light For State-
Based Private Retirement Accounts, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (BNA) (Aug. 7, 
2013). For examples of other states’ efforts, see Brent Hunsberger, Oregon House 
Passes Bill to Examine Statewide Retirement Savings Plan, OREGON LIVE (June 
24, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/finance/index.ssf/2013/06/oregon_house 
_passes_bill_to_ex.html; National Conference of State Legislatures, State 
Sponsored Retirement Savings Plans for Non-Public Employees, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/state-sponsored-retirement-plans-for-
nonublic.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
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The Act is important, not only because of California’s size and status as a 
trendsetter, but because the task the Act addresses is pressing: increasing 
the retirement savings of the half of American workers not currently 
covered by employer-sponsored retirement arrangements.5 
 I write to explore the legal status of the Act, in particular the Act’s 
standing under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA)6 and the Internal Revenue Code (Code).7 The Act raises three 
important questions under ERISA and the Code: Are the accounts 
established by the Act individual retirement accounts for purposes of the 
Code?  Does ERISA preempt the employer mandate established by the 
Act?  Does ERISA preempt the Act’s provisions authorizing supplemental 
employer contributions to employees’ accounts established under the Act? 
The drafters of the Act were acutely sensitive to all three of these 
questions.8 
 The accounts created by the Act do not qualify as individual 
retirement accounts under the Code.  The hallmark of an individual 
                                                         
5 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS 124 (Apr. 2013) 
(“Tens of millions of U.S. households have not placed themselves on a path to 
become financially prepared for retirement. In addition, the proportion of U.S. 
workers participating in employer-sponsored plans has remained stagnant for 
decades at no more than about half the total work force . . . .”).  
6 ERISA was originally adopted as the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) and has repeatedly been 
amended. Many provisions of ERISA were adopted twice, once as tax law 
additions to the Internal Revenue Code and once as additions to Title 29 of the 
United States Code, enforced by the Department of Labor. It is today customary to 
refer to the labor provisions codified in Title 29 as “ERISA” and to refer to the tax 
provisions of ERISA by their respective designations in the Internal Revenue Code. 
This article follows this convention. On the dual tax/labor structure of ERISA, see 
JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 97 (5th ed. 
2010). 
7 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
8 See S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100043 to the 
CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012) (program not to be implemented “if it is determined that 
the program is an employee benefit plan under” ERISA or if the employees’ 
accounts under the program “fail to qualify” as IRAs) and §§ 100004(e) and 
100012(k) (supplementary employer contributions to be permitted only if such 
contributions “would not cause the program to be treated as an employee benefit 
plan under” ERISA)). 
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account for retirement planning purposes is the direct and unmediated 
assignment to the account holder of the rewards of good investment 
performance and the costs of investment loss.  In contrast, the accounts 
created under the Act are notional in nature, formula-based cash balance-
style defined benefit claims against a collective trust fund.  These notional 
accounts are credited with an assumed rate of return determined before the 
beginning of the year, regardless of the Trust’s actual investment 
experience during the year.  The Trust established by the California Act 
(not the individual employee/account holder) bears investment risk and is 
liable for underfunding.  The formula-based, cash balance-style accounts 
created by the Act do not qualify under the Code as individual retirement 
accounts as these accounts will not be decreased to reflect investment 
losses and will not directly benefit from current investment gains. 
 Suppose, however, that the Act is amended to make its accounts 
individual retirement accounts for purposes of Code § 408 by shifting 
investment reward and downside to the account holder.  In this case, the 
ERISA preemption status of the Act’s employer mandate reflects the 
Court’s contradictory guidance on ERISA preemption: ERISA § 514(a)9 
preempts the Act’s employer mandate under Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.10 
but not under the Court’s later decision in New York State Conference of 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.11 Since 
Travelers is the Court’s more recent and more persuasive approach to 
ERISA preemption, Travelers should control.  Thus, assuming amendment 
of the Act to convert the Act’s accounts into individual retirement 
accounts, the Act’s employer mandate should not be ERISA-preempted. 
 My conclusion is similar as to the third legal issue raised by the 
Act, whether ERISA preempts the provisions of the Act which authorize 
supplementary employer contributions to employees’ accounts established 
under the Act: this provision of the Act is ERISA-preempted under Shaw 
but survives § 514(a) scrutiny under Travelers’ more recent, more flexible, 
and more compelling approach to ERISA preemption.  
 In light of the foregoing, if Travelers controls (as it should), the 
Act could, as a legal matter, be salvaged by recasting the Act’s accounts as 
individual retirement accounts under which the employee/individual 
account holders bear investment risk and thus benefit directly from 
                                                         
9 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
10 See 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983). 
11 See 514 U.S. 645, 701 (1995). 
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investment gains and incur the costs of investment losses.  However, as the 
Act is currently structured, the Act fails muster under the Code because the 
notional accounts created by the Act do not qualify as individual retirement 
accounts. 
 There is, thus, a road map for amending the Act to make it Code 
and ERISA-compliant under Travelers: reformulate the accounts 
established under the Act as individual retirement accounts with 
investment reward and investment loss assigned to the account holder, 
rather than the current notional, formula-based design of the Act’s 
accounts.  However, under Shaw, there is no equivalent road map.  Since 
Travelers is the Supreme Court’s more recent and more convincing 
approach to ERISA preemption, the Act should be salvageable by 
converting its accounts to individual retirement accounts that allocate 
investment gain and loss to the account holders.  
 This Article first outlines the Act and then identifies five 
noteworthy features of the Act including the Act’s linkage of its employer 
mandate for retirement savings with a public investment vehicle for those 
savings as well as the Act’s characterization of the interests it creates as 
“accounts” rather than as annuities.  Part IV then discusses ERISA 
preemption, focusing upon the tension between Shaw and Travelers, and 
next introduces payroll deduction IRA arrangements.  In Part VI, this 
article explains its conclusions as to the three major issues raised by the 
Act under ERISA and the Code: the notional cash balance-style accounts 
created by the Act do not qualify as individual retirement accounts since 
the accounts established by the Act create a defined benefit-type, formula-
based claim against a collectively-managed fund.  Individual retirement 
accounts instead allocate investment gain and loss directly to the individual 
account holder.  If the Act were amended to recast its accounts as 
individual retirement accounts, the Act’s employer withholding mandate 
and the Act’s authorization of voluntary employer contributions should 
survive ERISA preemption under Travelers.  
 Legality, of course, is not the same as wisdom.  Thus, the final 
section addresses the choices other state legislatures, as well as Congress, 
confront if they elect to follow part or the entire path on which California 
has embarked to encourage private retirement savings.  Among these 
choices are an employer mandate without a state-sponsored savings vehicle 
like the California Trust, the augmentation of the federal tax credits for 
retirement plans and retirement savings with supplementary state tax 
credits, and the promotion of retirement savings through public education. 
Other legislatures may reasonably conclude that there is no role for the 
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states to play in light of both the robust market for retirement savings 
products and the federal government’s support for such savings. 
 President Obama has recently proposed a federal mandate under 
which employers with more than ten employees would be required to 
maintain either retirement plans or IRA coverage.12 However, the Obama 
proposal would not create the kind of public investment vehicle established 
under the California Act.  The President’s proposal ensures public debate 
about the appropriate function of government in encouraging retirement 
savings.  The Golden State’s Act will play an important role in that debate. 
In that debate, I favor state-by-state experimentation rather than any single 
approach to the task of encouraging greater retirement savings. 
 
II.  THE ACT, THE TRUST AND THE PROGRAM DESCRIBED 
 
 The Act13 creates a nine-member board14 (“the board”) to 
administer the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust15 (“the 
Trust”).  The Trust will “offer . . . a retirement savings program” to be 
known as the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program16 
(“the program”).  Integral to the program is an employer mandate, 
requiring California employers to maintain for their employees a “payroll 
deposit retirement savings arrangement.”17 Under these mandated 
arrangements, employees in the Golden State otherwise without 
employment-based retirement savings options will be able to contribute to 
                                                         
12 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 5, at 125. 
13 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012). 
14 Id. at § 3 (adding § 100002 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). In its original 
incarnation, the Act established a seven member board consisting of the Treasurer 
of California, California’s Director of Finance “or his or her designee,” the 
Controller of California, “[a]n individual with retirement savings and investment 
expertise appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules,” two gubernatorial 
appointees (one “[a] small business representative,” the other “[a] public member”) 
and “[a]n employee representative appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly.” Id. 
Senate Bill 923 then amended the Act to add two additional members to the board 
appointed by the Governor with no restrictions. See S.B. 923, 2012 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 1000002(a)(1)(H) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2013)). 
15 S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100004(a) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2013)). 
16 Id. (adding § 100000(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
17 Id. (adding §§ 100000(g) and 100032(d) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
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accounts managed by the Trust through employer withholding from 
employees’ paychecks.18 
 Within nine months “after the board opens the program for 
enrollment,”19 private and nonprofit employers20 in the Golden State must 
have such a payroll “arrangement to allow employee participation in the 
program”21 through payroll deductions unless one of several statutory 
exemptions applies.  Under one of these exemptions, an employer need not 
maintain a state-sponsored payroll deduction arrangement if the employer 
has fewer than five employees.22 Moreover, employees cannot participate 
in the California program if they are covered by the Railway Labor Act23 
or by a multiemployer pension plan.24 In addition, a California employer 
need not enroll employees in the state-run program established by the Act 
if the employer sponsors its own retirement program for its employees25 or 
if the employer has in place an IRA payroll deduction plan for its 
employees.26 
 Thus, when it takes effect, the Act will promulgate an employer 
retirement savings mandate for California employers.  Under the Act’s 
mandate, Golden State employers with five or more employees will be 
required to have one of three forms of retirement savings arrangements for 
their employees, i.e., an employer-sponsored plan (including a 
multiemployer or railroad pension), a payroll IRA deduction plan or, as the 
default option, a state-sponsored “payroll deposit retirement savings 
arrangement”27 under the California program established by the Act.28  
                                                         
18 Id. (adding § 100012(j) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
19 Id. (adding § 100032(d) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). During this nine-
month period, larger employers must offer payroll deposit retirement savings 
arrangements. Id. (adding §§ 100032(b) and 100032(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). 
20 Id. (adding § 100000(d) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). Public employers 
are specifically exempted from the requirements of the Act. Id. 
21 Id. (adding § 100032(d) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
22 See id. (adding § 100000(d) to the CL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
23 Id. (adding § 100000(c)(2)(A-B) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
24 Id. (adding § 100000(c)(2)(B) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
25 Id. (adding §§ 100032(d) and 100032(f) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (adding § 100000(f) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
28 Employers employing four or fewer employees can participate in the 
program, though they are not required to do so. Id. (adding § 100032(a) to the CAL. 
GOV’T CODE (2012) (“[A]ny employer may choose to have a payroll deposit 
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 When a California employer maintains a payroll savings deposit 
arrangement pursuant to the state-sponsored program, any of the 
employer’s employees will be able to affirmatively elect against 
participation in such arrangement.29 Absent such an election of 
nonparticipation, each California employee covered by the state-run 
program will “contribute 3 percent of the employee’s annual salary or 
wages to the program”30 through employer withholding.  However, the Act 
provides that an employee may specify a contribution rate other than 3%.31 
The Act also provides that the board “may adjust the contribution” rate 
under the program to as little as 2% of an employee’s compensation and as 
much as 4% of an employee’s compensation”32 and may “vary” the 
program’s contribution rate between 2% and 4% “according to the length 
of time the employee has contributed to the program.”33 
 Employee contributions pursuant to the program will be withheld 
by employers and remitted to the Trust.34 The Act also permits employers 
to make supplementary contributions from their own funds to employees’ 
accounts under the program as long as such employer contributions “would 
not cause the program to be treated as an employee benefit plan under” 
ERISA.35 
 The Trust will provide a public vehicle for the investment of 
employees’ retirement savings.  The Trust and the program, governed by a 
public board,36 will collect and provide for the investment of those 
                                                         
retirement savings arrangement to allow employee participation in the program.”)). 
29 Id. (adding §§ 100032(e)(1) and 100032(g) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). 
30 Id. (adding § 100032(h) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. (adding § 100032(i) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. (adding §§ 100000(g) and 100012(j) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
35 Id. (adding §§ 100004(e) and 100012(k) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
Employer contributions cause the California program to become an employee 
benefit plan for ERISA purposes since such employer contributions transform a 
payroll deposit IRA arrangement limited to employees’ contributions into an 
employee benefit plan with employer contributions. However, such employer 
contributions do not trigger preemption under ERISA § 514(a) as explicated by 
Travelers. See infra notes 104-24 and accompanying text 
36 Id. (adding § 100002 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012), as subsequently 
amended by S.B. 923, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2012)). 
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savings.37 The monies held in the Trust may, at the board’s election, be 
invested by the treasurer of California.38 Alternatively, the board can 
arrange for the Trust’s funds to be invested by the board of the California 
state pension plan39 (commonly known as CalPERS)40 or by “private 
money managers,”41 or by some combination of CalPERS and private 
managers.42 Among the board’s other powers in its “capacity of trustee”43 
of the Trust, the board can “[p]rocure insurance against any loss in 
connection with the property, assets, or activities of the trust, and secure 
private underwriting and reinsurance to manage risk and insure the 
retirement savings rate of return.”44 
 If the board does not purchase such insurance to protect against 
losses, the board must instead provide an “annuity, or other funding 
mechanism . . . at all times that protects the value of individuals’ 
accounts.”45 
 Withholding by participating employers under the program is 
intended to qualify as “payroll deposit IRA arrangements.”46 Each 
employee contributing to the Trust through employer withholding will 
have a notional account in the Trust.47 These notional accounts are 
intended to qualify as individual retirement accounts under Code § 408.48 
The Act specifically prohibits the board from implementing “the program 
if the IRA arrangements” offered under the program “fail to qualify for the 
favorable federal income tax treatment ordinarily accorded to IRAs under 
the Internal Revenue Code . . . .”49 This favorable treatment includes the 
                                                         
37 According to the Act, the Trust is intended to be financially self-sustaining, 
paying its administrative costs from the assets contributed to the Trust. See id. 
(adding §§ 100004(c) and 100042 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
38 Id. (adding § 100004(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
39 Id. 
40 See CALPERS, www.calpers.ca.gov (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
41 S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100004(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (adding § 100010(a) introductory language to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). 
44 Id.  
45 Id. (adding § 1000013 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
46 Id. (adding § 100008(a) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
47 Id. (adding § 100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
48 Id. (adding § 100043 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
49 Id. An interesting issue that need not be addressed today is whether the Trust 
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tax-free growth of investments held within individual retirement 
accounts,50 the deductibility of contributions to traditional individual 
retirement accounts,51 and the exclusion from income taxation of qualified 
distributions from Roth individual retirement accounts.52 
  Each employee’s account under the program is notional in 
nature.53 Each such account will be credited with the employee’s 
contributions54 through the employer’s payroll withholding as well as with 
the “[S]tated interest rate”55 selected annually and prospectively by the 
board and with the Trust’s “excess earnings”56 which the board may, but 
not need, allocate to employees’ accounts.  During each year, the board is 
“to declare the stated rate at which interest shall be allocated to program 
accounts for the following program year.”57 
  There is no provision in the Act for allocating investment losses to 
employees’ accounts or otherwise adjusting such accounts downward to 
reflect such losses.  The employee’s “retirement savings benefit under the 
program”58 will be a claim against the Trust in “an amount equal to the 
balance in the [employee’s] program account.”59 
  As I discuss infra,60 since the Trust’s investment gains will not 
directly pass through to the notional accounts created under the Act, those 
accounts will not qualify as individual retirement accounts under the Code. 
The Trust, when it sets “the stated interest rate,” can pass through some, 
all, or none of the Trust’s prior investment earnings.  Similarly, the board 
can retroactively credit accounts with some, all or none of the Trust’s 
“excess” earnings above the stated rate of return.  The board has no 
                                                         
would be tax exempt under I.R.C. § 115 (2006) as a governmental agency if the 
accounts established by the Act do not qualify as IRAs. Since the Act will not go 
into effect unless the accounts created by the Act are IRAs, this issue need not be 
confronted, at least for now. 
50 I.R.C. § 408(e)(1) (2011). 
51 I.R.C. § 219 (2011). 
52 I.R.C. § 408A(d)(1) (2011). 
53 S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100008(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). 
54 Id. (adding § 100008(a) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
55 Id. (adding §§ 100000(h) and 100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
56 Id. (adding § 100006(a-c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
57 Id. (adding § 100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
58 Id. (adding § 100008(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
59 Id. 
60 See infra notes 134-35. 
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authority to reduce account balances to reflect the Trust’s investment 
losses.  These features of the accounts created under the Act preclude those 
accounts from constituting individual retirement accounts under the Code 
since the Trust’s investment gains and losses do not pass directly to 
accounts, but are instead mediated through the decisions of the board and 
through the formulas the board determines. 
  The Act provides that the State of California has no “liability in 
connection with funding retirement benefits pursuant to” the program.61 
 The board is not to implement the program if employees’ accounts 
under the program “fail to qualify” as IRAs under the Internal Revenue 
Code62 or “if it is determined that the program is an employee benefit plan 
under” ERISA.63 Moreover, under S.B. 923, the provisions of the Act will 
go into effect only if another vote of the California legislature approves the 
program and the Trust.64 
 
 III.  FIVE NOTEWORTHY FEATURES OF THE ACT, THE TRUST 
AND THE PROGRAM 
 
 Five features of the Act, the Trust and the program are noteworthy. 
First, the Act links its employer mandate to withhold and remit employees’ 
retirement contributions to the state-created (but not state-guaranteed) 
Trust holding and investing such contributions.  However, an employer 
mandate need not be adopted together with a public investment vehicle like 
the Trust. 
A state legislature determined to mandate employee retirement 
saving could instead require all employers to maintain a qualified plan or 
an IRA payroll deduction arrangement without establishing the kind of 
                                                         
61 S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding §§ 100013, 100014(c)(3), and 100036 to 
the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
62 Id. (adding §§ 100043 and 100010(a)(11) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012), 
authorizing the board “in the capacity of trustee” to “[s]et minimum and maximum 
investment levels in accordance with contribution limits set for IRAs by the 
Internal Revenue Code.”). Presumably, the individual employee will be given the 
choice between conventional IRA tax treatment under I.R.C. § 408 or Roth IRA 
treatment under I.R.C. § 408A – if the Act’s accounts are modified to qualify as 
individual retirement accounts. 
63 Id. 
64 S.B. 923, 2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. at § 2 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100043.5 to the 
CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
558      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
state-sponsored accounts to be managed by the California Trust.  This is 
the approach embodied in President Obama’s proposal to establish a 
national employer mandate requiring retirement savings opportunities in 
the workplace without establishing any public investment vehicle for such 
savings.65 
 One could also envision a legislature creating a voluntary state-
sponsored investment trust for retirement savings (like current section 529 
college savings programs)66 without the legislature simultaneously 
enacting an employer mandate requiring workplace savings arrangements.  
However, the California Act links its employer mandate to a public 
investment vehicle by sending to the Trust all employee contributions 
withheld by employers pursuant to the program established under the Act.  
  A second notable feature of the California Act is the Act’s attempt 
to qualify employees’ accounts under the Act as individual retirement 
accounts.  Individual retirement accounts are today ubiquitous instruments 
for holding employees’ retirement wealth.67 However, as I discuss infra,68 
employees’ accounts under the California program are not individual 
retirement accounts, defined contribution devices under which account 
owners benefit directly from the gains earned by those assets while bearing 
the losses incurred by those assets.  Instead, the employees’ interests in 
their notional accounts in the California Trust resemble participants’ 
entitlements under cash balance pension plans.  Cash balance plans are 
defined benefit arrangements.  An employee covered by a cash balance 
pension has a notional account to which is credited contributions and an 
assumed rate of interest.69 
  On retirement, the cash balance participant is entitled to receive 
the balance in his notional account, rather than an amount which reflects 
                                                         
65 See supra note 5. 
66 See EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW 
THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 64-70 (2007) 
(discussing Section 529 plans). 
67 See id. at 39-42 (discussing IRAs). 
68 See infra notes 134-35. 
69 See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan: A 
Critique, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1-1—1-19 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2007); Alvin D. Lurie, 
Murphy’s Law Strikes Again: Twilight For Cash Balance Design?, 101 TAX 
NOTES 393 (Oct. 20, 2003); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 
19 VA. TAX REV. 683 (2000). 
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the value of the underlying assets held by the plan.  If the employees’ cash 
balance accounts aggregate to more than the assets in the plan, the 
sponsoring employer is obligated to fund this difference.  Conversely, if 
the assets held by a cash balance pension exceed the total of the 
employees’ notional accounts, those extra assets may revert to the 
employer.70 Thus, as a defined benefit plan, a cash balance pension assigns 
the benefits and downsides of investment performance to the sponsoring 
employer. 
  The accounts created by the Act resemble this kind of cash 
balance arrangement rather than an individual retirement account under 
which investment risk is, for better or worse, assigned to the account 
holder.  The Act does not authorize the allocation of investment losses to 
the accounts authorized by the Act.  Under the Act, there is no direct 
connection between the Trust’s investment gains and the balances of such 
accounts.  Rather, the Trust’s investment gains will be mediated through 
the board’s selection of a stated rate of return for employees’ accounts and 
by the board’s decisions to allocate (or not) some or all of the Trust’s 
“excess” investment gains above the stated rate of return.  That stated 
return, to be picked before the year begins, may prove higher, the same or 
lower than the Trust’s actual investment performance.  As I discuss infra,71 
because the cash balance-style accounts established under the Act do not 
assign investment risk to the employee/account holders, such accounts do 
not qualify as individual retirement accounts under the Code. 
 Third, the Act repeatedly and specifically characterizes 
participants’ interests under the programs as “accounts” rather than as 
annuities.72 The Act does not subject the Trust to California’s regulation of 
insurance companies73 or purport to characterize the Trust as an insurance 
company.  Thus, as I discuss further infra,74 the notional accounts 
established by the Act not only fail to qualify as individual retirement 
accounts under the Code, but they also are not individual retirement 
annuities for purposes of Code § 408(b).75 
 A fourth notable feature of the Golden State’s program is its 
                                                         
70 Such a reversion is subject to an excise tax. 26 I.R.C. § 4980(a) (2010). 
71 See supra text accompanying notes 68-69. 
72 See generally S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding § 
100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE). 
73 See generally CAL. INS. CODE. 
74 See discussion infra 166-176 and accompanying text. 
75 See 26 U.S.C. § 408(b) (2006). 
560      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
automatic enrollment of eligible employees, subject to each employee’s 
ability to opt out of the program if the employee so chooses.  The 
program’s automatic enrollment feature reflects the influential 
observations of behavioral economists that individuals are often subject to 
inertia and procrastination in making important decisions like the decision 
to save for retirement.76 From the premise of inertia and procrastination, 
many commentators conclude that higher participation rates can be 
achieved in 401(k) and similar retirement savings arrangements if 
employees are presumptively included in such arrangements and required 
to elect out, rather than being obligated to affirmatively elect coverage 
under such arrangements.77 Just as procrastination and inertia discourage 
employees from electing to save for retirement, procrastination and inertia 
discourage employees from electing against such saving when saving is 
presumptive and must be affirmatively rejected. 
 This insight of behavioral economics led Congress to amend Code 
§ 401(k) to authorize sponsoring employers to adopt automatic enrollment 
provisions.78 Under these provisions, employees contribute from their 
salaries to their retirement accounts unless such employees choose not to 
contribute.  Initial “[s]tudies have shown that automatically enrolling 
people into 401(k) plans can achieve higher levels of participation.”79 In 
this spirit, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act mandates that 
large employers must automatically enroll their covered employees into 
employer-sponsored health plans, subject to the employees’ ability to opt 
out.80 The California Act and the program the Act creates embrace this 
                                                         
76 Hanming Fang and Dan Silverman, Distinguishing Between Cognitive 
Biases, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 51, 55-56 (Edward J. McCaffery and Joel 
Slemrod eds., 2006). 
77 See id.; WILLIAM J. CONGDON ET AL., POLICY AND CHOICE 77-79 (2011); 
James J. Choi et al., Saving for Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance, in 
BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 76, at 304; Annie Lowrey, Tax Breaks 
and Savings Play Role in Budget Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2012, at A19 
(“policies that automatically saved a portion of a worker’s income increased total 
savings by a substantial amount.”). 
78 26 I.R.C. § 401(k)(13) (2006). See also Fran Hawthorne, Heading for 
Retirement on Autopilot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013. 
79 Jonathan Barry Forman & Gordon D. Mackenzie, Optimal Rules for Defined 
Contribution Plans: What Can We Learn from the U.S. and Australian Pension 
Systems 36 (Austl. Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954879. 
80 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1511, 
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increasingly fashionable pattern of automatic enrollment under which 
eligible employees presumptively contribute to their respective program 
accounts unless they affirmatively reject such contributions.81 
 A fifth notable feature of the Act is the acknowledgment of the 
problem of implicit government guarantees and the Act’s explicit 
repudiation of any such guarantees.  Recent discussion about implicit 
government guarantees has occurred in the context of banks and other 
financial institutions deemed “too big to fail,” as well as government-
sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.82 Important 
commentators suggest that these large institutions and entities benefit from 
an unstated but widely-accepted understanding that the federal government 
could not permit any of these institutions or entities to become insolvent.83  
From this vantage, there is an implicit guarantee that the federal 
government will again bail out many of these institutions and entities, as 
the federal government did during the Great Recession. 
 The Act explicitly and repeatedly warns that the State of California 
is not liable to the employees who participate in the program.84 According 
to the Act, participating employees must be paid from the assets of the 
Trust including any private insurance coverage the Trust may purchase to 
guarantee the program’s promises to such employees.85 While the Act 
reiterates that the treasury of the Golden State does not stand behind the 
Trust or the program, some critics suggest that, despite the Act’s 
disclaimer of state liability to the employees who participate in the 
program, in a crunch, no future governor or legislature of California could 
in fact stand by idly if the Trust lacked the financial ability to pay the 
                                                         
124 Stat. 119, 252 (2010) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 by 
adding § 18A, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 218A (2010)). 
81 President Obama takes a similar approach in his proposal for a federal 
employer mandate for workplace retirement savings. See supra text accompanying 
notes 4-5. 
82 See, e.g., SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS (2012); ANDREW ROSS 
SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND 
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS – AND 
THEMSELVES (2009); Gretchen Morgenson, One Safety Net That Needs to Shrink, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2012, at BU1.   
83 See, e.g., Bair, supra note 82, at 28 (“The moral hazard problem is worse for 
very large institutions that the market perceives as being too big to fail.”). 
84 See S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding §§ 100013, 
100014(c)(3) and 100036 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
85 Id. (adding § 100010(a)(9) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
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account balances of such employees.86 In discussion of S.B. 1234, the 
California Department of Finance expressed this concern that California’s 
treasury might ultimately wind up responsible for the program’s 
commitments.87 However, the text of the Act is explicit that the Golden 
State’s public treasury does not stand behind the Trust.   
 
IV. ERISA PREEMPTION: Shaw v. Travelers  
 
 ERISA’s preemption clause, ERISA § 514(a),88 is extremely broad: 
ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” regulated by ERISA.  
Starting with its decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.89 through District 
of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade,90 the U.S. Supreme 
Court interpreted § 514(a) expansively.91 Under the case law developed 
during this period, § 514(a) preempts any state law which “has a 
connection with or reference to” an employee benefit plan.92 Under this 
                                                         
86 See, e.g., Frank Keegan, Private Pension Plan Would Raid Taxpayers to Fill 
Public Pension Gap, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 29, 2012, at A13 (“But the 
overriding question left answered on the issue of `guaranteed’ retirement income is: 
guaranteed by whom? Answer: taxpayers, the same people now stuck with the 
insurmountable debt of a retirement system in an accelerating death spiral.”); Rich 
Danker, California Doubles Down on Pension Promising, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 2012, at A13 (The Act “confuses retirement as an expectation, rather than 
an objective.”); Judy Lin, The Problems with SB1234, ASSOC. OF CAL. LIFE & 
HEALTH INS. CO., May 30, 2012 (“Funding shortfalls and huge taxpayer 
liabilities.”). 
87 See Kevin DeLeon, Department of Finance Bill Analysis (May 2, 2012) (on 
file with the California Department of Finance) (“Despite the bill’s stated intent to 
shield the state from financial liability, the state ultimately could be responsible for 
benefit payments under federal law, putting the state at serious risk of billions of 
dollars in unfunded liabilities if investment performance falters under the 
Program.”). 
88 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
89 See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
90 See D.C. v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992). 
91 For a detailed discussion of this initial stage of the Court’s interpretation of 
ERISA § 514(a), see Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the 
New Jurisprudence of ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 815-27 
(1999). 
92 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97. 
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unforgiving standard, ERISA preemption is nearly automatic.93 
 The Court subsequently retreated from Shaw’s formulation of 
ERISA preemption, without (so far, at least) acknowledging that retreat.  In 
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Insurance Co.,94 the Court formulated a more restrained (though still quite 
broad) understanding of ERISA § 514(a), presuming “that Congress does 
not intend to supplant state law.”95 
 Travelers involved surcharges New York State imposed as part of 
its regulation of hospital rates.  Pursuant to this regulation, hospitals 
charged patients covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, by Medicaid, or by an 
HMO only basic billing rates for their hospital stays.  Other patients, e.g., 
those covered by commercial insurers, by self-insured funds, or by 
volunteer firefighter benefits, paid to the hospital a 13% surcharge for their 
hospitalizations.  Hospitalized patients covered by commercial insurance 
also paid a second surcharge of 11%, which the hospital remitted to the 
state.  The impact of these surcharges was to encourage employers to 
switch their medical plans from commercial insurance and self-funding to 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage to achieve lower net costs for their 
employees’ hospitalizations. 
 In a straightforward application of Shaw and its expansive test for 
ERISA preemption (“connection with or reference to”), the Second 
Circuit96 held that ERISA § 514(a) preempted New York’s hospital 
surcharges.  These surcharges, the appeals court concluded, improperly 
burdened employers’ ERISA-regulated health care plans with higher costs 
if such plans declined to use Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance coverage. 
 In a sharp (but, so far, unacknowledged) break with Shaw, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and upheld the Empire State’s 
hospital surcharges against ERISA preemption challenge.  The 
interpretation of § 514(a) in any situation, Travelers declares, starts with 
the “presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”97 
Through § 514(a), Congress sought “to avoid a multiplicity of [state] 
regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of 
employee benefit plans.”98 The danger to such national uniformity is 
                                                         
93 See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 816. 
94 514 U.S. 645 (1995) [hereinafter Travelers]. 
95 See id. at 654. 
96 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1993). 
97 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654. 
98 Id. at 657. 
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greatest when a state law dictates “employee benefit structures or their 
administration”99 or provides “alternative enforcement mechanisms.”100 A 
state law is not ERISA-preempted under § 514(a) merely because of its 
“indirect economic influence” on employee benefit plans.101 
 It is hard to reconcile Travelers’ more forgiving approach to 
ERISA preemption with Shaw.  The Court has, so far, declined to confront 
the tension in its ERISA preemption case law.102 
 Often, the tension between Shaw and Travelers does not matter. 
For example, Maryland’s “Wal-Mart” Act is ERISA-preempted under 
either approach.103 However, as I discuss below, the California Act 
presents a case where the two different formulations of ERISA preemption 
lead to two different outcomes.  ERISA preempts the Act’s employer 
mandate and the Act’s authorization of voluntary employer contributions 
under the Shaw standard with its near automatic preemption of state law.  
However, the Act’s employer mandate and optional employer contributions 
survive under the revised and more compelling approach to ERISA § 
514(a) later embodied in Travelers. 
 
V. THE PAYROLL DEDUCTION IRA SAFE HARBOR  
 
 ERISA preempts state laws as such laws “relate to any employee 
benefit plans”104 governed by ERISA.  ERISA identifies two kinds of 
employee benefit plans,105 “welfare” plans,106 which provide fringe 
benefits such as medical, sickness and death benefit coverage, and 
“pension” plans,107 which provide “retirement income to employees”108 or 
otherwise result “in a deferral of income by employees for periods 
                                                         
99 Id. at 658. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 659. 
102 See Zelinsky, supra note 93, for a discussion on the tension within the 
Supreme Court’s ERISA preemption case law. 
103 Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland’s “Wal-Mart” Act: Policy and Preemption, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 847, 851-70 (2006). 
104 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
105 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2006). 
106 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). 
107 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006). 
108 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
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extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond.”109 
 The regulations of the Department of Labor (DOL) create a safe 
harbor from ERISA regulation for what have come to be called “payroll 
deduction IRA” arrangements.110 Per the regulations,111 a payroll deduction 
IRA arrangement is not a “pension” plan for ERISA purposes, chiefly 
because only the employee contributes to his IRA under such an 
arrangement; there are no employer contributions.  Since it is not a pension 
plan, a payroll deduction device is not an “employee benefit plan” and thus 
is not regulated by ERISA.  Consequently, ERISA § 514(a) does not 
preempt a state law relating to a payroll deduction IRA arrangement 
because such a payroll deduction arrangement is not an employee benefit 
plan for purposes of ERISA.  The drafters of the California Act attempted 
to qualify the Golden State’s program for this safe harbor112 so that the 
program will constitute a payroll deduction IRA arrangement, subject to 
state regulation, rather than an ERISA-regulated pension plan with respect 
to which state law is preempted. 
 The DOL regulations define a payroll deduction IRA arrangement, 
outside ERISA’s coverage, as a “completely voluntary”113 scheme which is 
                                                         
109 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
110 Announcement 99-2, 1991-1 CB 305; see also EBSA & IRS, Payroll 
Deduction IRAs for Small Businesses, www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/ 
PayrollDedIRAs.pdf. 
111 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d) (2013). 
112 S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100032 to the CAL. 
GOV’T CODE (2012), describing the Act as permitting and requiring “payroll 
deposit retirement savings arrangement[s].”). 
113 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(ii). Employees’ participation in the withholding 
program created by the Act would be “completely voluntary” because every 
employee under the Act would have the option to opt out of the program. S.B. 1234 
§3 (Cal. 2012) (adding §§ 100014(c)(3), 100032(e)(1) and 100032(g) to the CAL 
GOV’T CODE (2012)). There is a counterargument that participation in the program 
would not be “completely voluntary” since the employee would have the burden of 
opting out. However, this burden does not seem weighty enough to conclude that 
employees’ participation in the program would be less than voluntary. The 
Department of Labor (“DOL”) came to a similar conclusion in the context of health 
savings accounts (“HSAs”). Specifically, DOL’s Employee Benefits Security 
Administration concluded that “the establishment of an HSA by an employee [is] 
‘completely voluntary’” when an employer creates and funds an HSA as long as the 
employee “may move the funds to another HSA or otherwise withdraw the funds.” 
Robert J. Doyle, Health Savings Accounts – ERISA Q&As, FIELD ASSISTANCE 
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solely employee-financed.  No contributions can come from the 
employer.114 Under an IRA payroll arrangement, the “sole involvement of 
the employer” “is without endorsement to permit the sponsor to publicize 
the program,” “to collect contributions through payroll deductions,” and to 
remit such contributions to the employees’ respective IRAs.115 
 Payroll deduction IRA arrangements contrast with two other IRA-
based retirement savings devices, the “simplified employee pension” 
(SEP)116 and the “simple retirement account (SRA).”117 For purposes of the 
present discussion, the principal difference between these IRA-based 
savings devices and payroll deduction IRAs is that employers make 
contributions to SEPs and SRAs, but do not make contributions under 
payroll deduction IRA arrangements.  Because the employer contributes to 
a SEP or a SRA, a SEP or a SRA is (unlike a payroll deduction IRA) an 
ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan.118 
 Under a SEP, the employer makes contributions to IRAs for its 
employees in proportion to such employees’ respective compensation.119 
SRAs require employer contributions emulating the safe harbor 
contributions for 401(k) plans.  Specifically, an employer sponsoring SRAs 
for its employees must either match employees’ salary reduction 
contributions to their IRAs120 or must contribute across-the-board to 
                                                         
BULL. NO. 2006-02, Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor (Oct. 27, 2006), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fab2006-2.pdf. This 
conclusion is persuasive and confirms that employees’ participation in the 
withholding program created by the Act would be “completely voluntary” within 
the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(ii). 
114 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(i). 
115 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(iii). Moreover, the employer cannot receive 
“consideration in the form of cash or otherwise, other than reasonable 
compensation for services actually rendered in connection with payroll 
deductions.” 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(iv). 
116 26 U.S.C. § 408(k) (2006). 
117 26 U.S.C. § 408(p) (2006). 
118 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006). 
119 26 U.S.C. § 408(k)(3) (2006). Before 1997, employers could establish so-
called “SAR-SEPs,” simplified employee pensions with salary reduction 
arrangements under which employees can also contribute to their respective IRAs 
subject to 401(k)-type deferral testing. While existing SAR-SEPs were 
grandfathered, new SAR-SEPs can no longer be created. 26 U.S.C. § 408(k)(6)(H) 
(2006). 
120 See infra notes 204-210 and accompanying text. 
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employees’ IRAs at a rate of 2% of each employee’s compensation.121 
 As I discuss infra,122 if a California employer were to make 
employer contributions under the provisions of the Act authorizing such 
optional employer contributions, these voluntary employer contributions 
would convert the California program for this employer from a payroll 
deduction IRA arrangement,123 limited to employee contributions, into an 
ERISA-regulated employee pension plan, namely, either a SEP or a SRA 
financed by employer contributions.  As I also discuss below,124 under 
Shaw, ERISA § 514(a) preempts the provisions of the Act authorizing 
employer contributions though those provisions are not preempted under 
Travelers. 
 
VI. THE ACT’S NOTIONAL ACCOUNTS ARE NOT INDIVIDUAL 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS   
 
A.  APPLYING THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF ERISA AND THE CODE 
 
 A fundamental question is whether the accounts established under 
the Act are individual retirement accounts for purposes of the Code.  The 
drafters of the Act labeled these as “accounts” and intended for these self-
proclaimed accounts to qualify as individual retirement accounts.125 The 
Act prohibits the board from implementing “the program if the IRA 
arrangements” offered under the program “fail to qualify for the favorable 
federal income tax treatment ordinarily accorded to IRAs under the 
Internal Revenue Code . . . .”126 
 The cash balance-style notional accounts established by the Act do 
not qualify as individual retirement accounts under the Code as the Act’s 
accounts do not benefit directly from investment gains nor do such 
                                                         
121 26 U.S.C. § 408(p)(2)(B)(i) (2006). The 2% employer contributions under 
simple retirement accounts are similar to the 3% employer contributions under one 
type of 401(k) safe harbor arrangement. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(12)(C) (2006). 
122 See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text. 
123 This assumes that the Act will be amended to convert its cash balance-style 
“nominal” accounts into true IRAs that allocate investment risk to the account 
holder. 
124 See infra notes 211-219 and accompanying text. 
125 S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100043 to the CAL. 
GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
126 Id. 
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accounts bear investment losses.  The accounts created by the Act are 
notional accounts that give the employee a formula-based defined benefit-
type claim against the assets held collectively by the Trust.  That claim is 
not based on the value of those Trust assets.  California’s program is not a 
defined contribution arrangement with individual accounts assigning 
investment risk and reward to the account holder.  Accounts under the Act 
will be credited with an assumed rate of return determined before the 
commencement of the year.127 For any year, the Trust’s actual investment 
performance may prove to be higher, the same as, or lower than the rate 
assumed before the year began.  The board can retroactively allot to the 
program accounts some, all, or none of the Trust’s “excess” investment 
gains above the stated rate of return.  In any event, accounts under the Act 
will not be decreased to reflect the Trust’s investment losses.  
Consequently, the cash balance-style notional accounts that the Act 
authorizes are not individual retirement accounts. 
 Internal Revenue Code § 408, which establishes the “individual 
retirement account” as a matter of federal law, does not define that 
statutory term.  However, as part of ERISA (which created the IRA),128 
Congress twice129 adopted a statutory definition to distinguish defined 
contribution arrangements, such as money purchase pensions130 and profit 
sharing plans,131 from defined benefit pensions.  The ERISA (i.e., Title 29) 
version of this definition makes clear that the term “individual account 
plan” is synonymous with “defined contribution plan” and provides that,  
 
[t]he term “individual account plan” or “defined 
contribution plan” means a pension plan which provides 
for an individual account for each participant and for 
                                                         
127 Id. (adding § 100008(b) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
128 See An Act to Provide Pension Reform, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2002(b), 88 
Stat. 829, 959-66 (1974) (adding § 408 to the United States Code, creating the 
individual retirement account). 
129 As observed supra, many provisions of ERISA were adopted twice, once as 
additions to the Internal Revenue Code and once as additions to Title 29 of the 
United States Code, enforced by the Department of Labor. See supra note 6. 
130 On money purchase pension plans, see ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 2; 
LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 50-51; LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. 
MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 33 (3d ed. 2012). 
131 On profit sharing plans, see ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 2, 4, 14; LANGBEIN 
ET AL., supra note 6, at 51-52; FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 130, at 33-34. 
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benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the 
participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and 
losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants 
which may be allocated to such participant’s account.132 
 
The Internal Revenue Code version of this definition, today part of the tax 
statute as 26 U.S.C. § 414(i),133 is identical except that the tax law 
exclusively uses the term “defined contribution plan.”       
  Under this twice-enacted definition, an account exists for 
retirement savings purposes only when a participant’s interest in his own 
account is “based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant’s 
account, and any income, expenses, gain and losses, and any forfeitures of 
accounts . . . which may be allocated to such participant’s account.”134 An 
individual account does not exist for retirement savings purposes if an 
external formula, operating independently of actual earnings and losses, 
determines a participant’s entitlement under the retirement plan.  Thus, a 
retirement account (in contrast to a defined benefit arrangement) exists 
only when investment risk is placed directly on the account holder so that 
all investment gain automatically inures to the advantage of the account 
holder and investment losses decrease the account holder’s entitlement 
under the plan.   
 In contrast, the Act’s notional, cash balance-style accounts do not 
reflect the Trust’s actual investment experience but instead implement a 
defined benefit-style formula, namely, contributions augmented by an 
assumed rate of return unreduced by any losses.  Under the California Act, 
the account holder is entitled to this formula-established amount, 
regardless of the Trust’s actual investment performance.  The account 
holder’s interest does not derive directly from the value of the assets held 
by the Trust.  Rather, the account holder has a defined benefit-style, 
formula-based claim against the collective fund held by the Trust.  This 
formula ignores losses and automatically credits each account with an 
assumed rate of return, regardless of the Trust’s actual investment 
performance.  Hence, the accounts to be created under the Act do not 
comply with the statutory mandate that IRAs must provide “benefits based 
solely upon the amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any 
                                                         
132 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006). 
133 26 U.S.C. § 414(i) (2006). 
134 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006). 
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income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures . . . .”135 
 Suppose, for example, a year for which the California board 
assumes a return of 3% while the Trust established by the Act actually 
experiences a net investment gain of 5%.  The board could retroactively 
allocate this “excess” investment gain to the program’s accounts or could 
consider this superior investment performance in setting the stated return 
for the following year.  The board may also do both or neither.  Under any 
of these scenarios, there will be no direct connection between the Trust’s 
investment performance and the accounts’ balances.  Any investment gain 
is mediated through the board and its implementation of the statutory 
command to assume a rate of return before the beginning of each year. 
 Suppose, moreover, a year in which the Trust losses money on the 
investments it holds.  The Act does not authorize a decrease in account 
balances to reflect these losses.  Following a loss year, the board might 
assume a 0% return so that account balances stay the same in the face of 
the prior year’s investment losses.  However, the statutory definition of an 
individual account requires that losses reduce account balances.136 As the 
Act is written, there is no provision for such loss-based reductions to 
account balances under the California program.   
 In short, as a statutory matter, all retirement accounts, including 
individual retirement accounts, must directly reflect investment gains and 
losses.  The formula-based, cash balance-style accounts fashioned by the 
California Act do not and thus cannot constitute individual retirement 
accounts under Internal Revenue Code § 408.  
 
B.  APPLYING THE CASE LAW ON RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS 
 
 Also instructive in this context is the seminal decision of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Connolly v. Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corp.137 Connolly, and its progeny,138 confirm that the defined 
                                                         
135 Id.; I.R.C. § 414(i) (2006). 
136 Id. 
137 Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 581 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1978). 
138 Connolly has been cited and followed in three subsequent decisions 
addressing the distinction between defined benefit pensions and defined 
contribution/individual account plans: Concord Control, Inc. v. Int’l Union, United 
Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 647 F.2d 701, 704-05 
(6th Cir. 1981); Matter of Defoe Shipbuilding Co., 639 F.2d 311, 313 (6th Cir. 
1981); In re Gray-Grimes Tool Co., Inc. Pension Plan, 546 F. Supp. 102, 107-09 
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benefit-style accounts established by the Act are not individual retirement 
accounts for purposes of the Code. 
 The question before the court in Connolly was whether a 
multiemployer139 pension plan was a defined benefit plan, subject to the 
plan termination insurance administered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (“PBGC”), or was a defined contribution/individual account 
plan, outside the coverage of the PBGC and its insurance program.140 
Starting with ERISA’s statutory definition of a defined 
contribution/individual account plan,141 the appeals court concluded that 
the plan at issue in Connolly was a defined benefit pension because 
benefits were based on a formula rather than the actual investment 
experience of any particular individual account. 
 The appeals court noted that, under the Connolly plan, 
“[c]ontributions on behalf of participants are pooled in a general fund . . . 
[T]he participant has no right, title, or interest in these [contributed] 
amounts.”142 Rather, the participant’s entitlement under the plan was based 
on a specified formula.  Such a formula is a feature of a defined benefit 
plan, which, as its name implies, defines for each participant a retirement 
benefit by applying a formula established in the plan.  This formula applies 
irrespective of the plan’s actual investment performance. 
 In Connolly, the plan’s formula utilized the participant’s years of 
service to determine the participant’s retirement benefit.  Under the 
California program, a cash balance-type formula creates a notional account 
consisting of cumulative contributions adjusted by an assumed rate of 
return, unreduced by any losses.  The board can, but need not, retroactively 
credit accounts with some or all of the Trust’s “excess” investment 
earnings.  As is true of the cash balance accounts that the Act’s accounts 
emulate, actual investment performance will not directly increase the 
participants’ benefits in their accounts in the California program, nor will 
investment losses decrease such benefits. 
 Also instructive in this context is the supplementary test deployed 
by the Connolly court, the possibility of underfunding.  “[B]y definition, an 
                                                         
(E.D. Mich. 1982). 
139 For discussion of multiemployer pension plans, see LANGBEIN ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 70-77. 
140 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (2006) (PBGC insurance does not apply to “an 
individual account plan”). 
141 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006). 
142 Connolly, 581 F.2d at 733. 
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individual account plan can never be underfunded”143 since the account 
holder is entitled to whatever total his account grows or falls, based on the 
account’s actual investment performance.  In contrast, there can be 
underfunding with cash balance notional accounts since these are defined 
benefit devices; if plan assets are less than a cash balance participant’s 
notional account total, the participant is still entitled to this larger formula-
based total.  Conversely, if a cash balance plan has more assets than are 
necessary to pay every participant the amount in his notional account, that 
excess can revert to the employer.144 
  Like the plan at issue in Connolly, the California program creates 
a defined benefit-type cash balance entitlement that may be underfunded 
(or overfunded).  Whether assets in the Trust are more or less than the 
amount in participants’ notional accounts, the California participants are 
entitled to their respective formula-based entitlements as reflected in those 
notional accounts.145 If assets in the Trust are insufficient to pay these 
amounts, the account holders will have a claim against the Trust’s 
collective assets for the holders’ respective formula-based benefits.  The 
California account holder under the Act has a defined benefit-type claim 
against this total pool of Trust assets, a claim for the formula-based total in 
his notional account. 
 Significant in this context is the Act’s authorization of the board to 
purchase insurance to guarantee against underfunding.146 As the Ninth 
Circuit observed in Connolly, individual account plans cannot be 
underfunded.  Insurance against underfunding is the hallmark of a defined 
benefit pension that promises a benefit-based formula independent of the 
value of the assets actually financing the pension.  Today, defined benefit 
insurance is administered by the PBGC, established by ERISA.147 If a 
defined benefit pension plan is covered by such insurance148 and if the 
                                                         
143 Id. 
144 Such a reversion is subject to the excise tax of Code § 4980.  I.R.C. § 4980 
(2006). 
145 S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2011) (adding § 100008(c) to 
the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
146 Id. (adding § 100010(a)(9) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
147 The PBGC and its insurance program are established in ERISA § 4001, 29 
U.S.C. § 1301 (2006). For background on the PBGC, see LANGBEIN ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 238-40; FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 130, at 626-30. 
148 Certain defined benefit plans are not subject to the PBGC and the insurance 
it provides. 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)-(c) (2006). 
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assets held by the plan’s trust are inadequate to pay promised benefits, the 
PBGC’s insurance coverage makes up the difference for basic, insured 
benefits.149 
  Under California’s Act, the board administering the program and 
Trust is authorized to obtain similar insurance from a private insurer.150 
This authorization indicates the risk of defined benefit underfunding under 
the Act.  Underfunding insurance is not purchased for a defined 
contribution account since there is no promised benefit to insure and thus 
no risk of underfunding against which to insure. 
 In short, under the statutory definition of a retirement account as 
explicated by Connolly, an individual account benefits directly from 
investment gain, loses value from investment losses, is not controlled by a 
formula separate from such gains and losses, and cannot be underfunded 
since the account holder is entitled to whatever his account balance may 
be.  Hence, the notional accounts under the Act are not individual 
retirement accounts.  Rather, the accounts created under the Act reflect a 
defined benefit-style formula that gives the account holder a fixed claim 
against a collectively-invested trust fund.  The Trust’s investment gains 
will not automatically pass through to participants’ program accounts but 
rather will be mediated by the board through its choice of an assumed rate 
of return and its decision whether or not to credit accounts with the Trust’s 
“excess” earnings.  Since the Act’s accounts can be underfunded (why else 
should the board buy insurance against the risk of underfunding?), those 
accounts are not individual retirement accounts. 
 The same conclusion emerges from the appeals courts’ decisions 
under the Code version of the definition of a defined contribution plan, 
Code § 414(i).151 The most recent of these appeals court decisions is 
George v. United States.152 In George, the taxpayers were retirees from 
federal service who, while working, had participated in the Civil Service 
Retirement System (CSRS).  These taxpayers had contributed to the CSRS 
from their salaries with after-tax dollars while the federal government, as 
employer, matched those contributions.  When they retired, the George 
taxpayers elected to receive their own after-tax contributions as lump sum 
distributions while the remainder of their respective CSRS retirement 
                                                         
149 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322-1322a (2006). 
150 S.B. 1234 § 3 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100010(a)(9) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). 
151 I.R.C. § 414(i) (2006). 
152 90 F.3d 473 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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benefits (attributable to employer contributions and earnings) were paid 
over time as annuities. 
 The issue in George was whether the lump sum and the annuity 
constituted a single, integrated contract or whether the lump sum 
(consisting of the employees’ own contributions) was a separate defined 
contribution pension plan, treated for tax purposes apart from the annuity.  
Under the former characterization, the lump sum (deemed to be integrated 
with the annuity) was taxable for income tax purposes.  Under the latter 
characterization, the lump sum (deemed to be a separate defined 
contribution plan) was a tax-free refund of the taxpayers’ own, already 
taxed contributions.153 The George taxpayers, relying on Code §§ 72(d) 
and 72(e)(5)(E), claimed that their contributions to the CSRS constituted a 
separate defined contribution plan.  From this premise, the lump sum 
payments were the tax-free return of their respective after-tax 
contributions.  The IRS, relying on Code § 72(e)(2)(A), asserted that the 
lump sum payments to the CSRS retirees were linked to the ongoing 
annuity payments and were thus fully taxable.  The resolution of this issue 
turned on the applicability of Code § 414(i): were the taxpayers’ after-tax 
contributions a separate defined contribution pension plan or were they 
part of the annuity paid by the CSRS? 
 The Federal Circuit, agreeing with two other courts of appeals,154 
held that the taxpayers’ after-tax contributions did not constitute a separate 
defined contribution plan with a “separate account”155 because a defined 
contribution plan must have an “investment-performance feature,”156 i.e., 
                                                         
153 “Employee contributions...under a defined contribution plan may be treated 
as a separate contract.” I.R.C. § 72(d) (2006). A lump sum distribution “received 
on or after the annuity starting date” is fully includable in gross income.  I.R.C. § 
72(e)(2)(A) (2006). However, I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(E) provides the counter rule for a 
lump sum “in full discharge of the obligation under the contract which is in the 
nature of a refund of the consideration paid for the contact.” I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(E) 
(2006). Such a lump sum in the nature of a refund is not taxable, but rather a return 
of the employees’ consideration.  
 The taxpayers in George, relying on Code §§ 72(d)-(e)(5)(E), claimed that 
their contributions to the CSRS constituted a separate defined contribution plan. 
Hence, the lump sums they received were in the nature of a tax-free return of the 
taxpayers’ own contributions.  90 F.3d at 477. 
154 Montgomery v. United States, 18 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 1994); Malbon v. 
United States, 43 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 1994). 
155 I.R.C. § 414(k) (2006). 
156 George, 90 F.3d at 477. 
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investment gains and losses must be allocated to the alleged account 
holder. 
Since the George taxpayers were not allocated any investment 
gains and losses attributable to their after-tax contributions, those 
taxpayers did not participate in any separate defined contribution pension 
plan with individual accounts.  The lump sum payment from the CSRA did 
not come from a true individual account that grew from investment gains 
and incurred investment losses. 
 Particularly helpful in this context is the George Court’s 
discussion of Guilzon v. Commissioner,157 the only appeals court decision 
holding that the lump sums received by CSRS retirees derive from a 
defined contribution plan separate from the annuities paid by CSRS to 
these retirees.  Rejecting Guilzon, the Federal Circuit correctly observed 
that, contrary to the conclusion of Guilzon, “[u]nder the concept of a 
defined contribution plan . . . if income is earned, that income is to be 
added to the participant’s account.”158 In contrast, the Act’s notional 
accounts are not true accounts directly absorbing investment risk.  Hence, 
such notional accounts are not individual retirement accounts under Code § 
408.  
 
C.  CONSIDERING CRITIQUES 
 
 Consider in this context seven potential critiques of my conclusion 
that the program accounts established by the California Act are not 
individual retirement accounts for purposes of the Code.  First, an 
individual retirement account can be invested in a fixed income instrument. 
The individual retirement account so invested resembles the notional 
accounts established under the Act.  Thus, this initial critique would 
continue, the accounts under the Act are not so different from conventional 
individual retirement accounts after all. 
 To explore this challenge, let us suppose that an individual 
retirement account with a balance of $100 is invested in a corporate bond 
that pays interest of 2% annually.  At the end of the year, this account 
predictably has $102, reflecting the original principal and the first year’s 
interest.  Suppose now that an account established under the Act is credited 
with $100 in employee contributions and that, for the year, the board 
                                                         
157 985 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1993). 
158 George, 90 F.3d at 478. 
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assumes a rate of return of 2%.  At the end of the year, this account under 
the California Act will also have a balance of $102.  This similarity, the 
argument goes, implies that the Act’s accounts are individual retirement 
accounts for purposes of Code § 408 since the Act’s accounts simulate 
individual retirement accounts invested in fixed income instruments. 
 As far as it goes, in this example the individual retirement account 
resembles the notional account under the Act.  However, this resemblance 
evaporates upon further consideration of investment risk and reward.  
Consider, for example, a scenario in which interest rates spike mid-year.  
In this case, the principal balance in the individual retirement account 
automatically declines as the bond decreases in value.  In contrast, the 
California account holder has a formula-based, fixed dollar claim against 
the collective assets of the California trust.  If those assets go down, or up, 
in value, the account holder has the same claim for $102 against the Trust 
since the assumed rate of interest for the year (2%) was fixed by the 
California board before the year began. 
 The story is similar if interest rates decline.  In this case, the value 
of the bond in the individual retirement account rises to the financial 
advantage of the account holder as the account’s balance grows in tandem 
with the increase in the bond’s value.  In contrast, the California account 
holder’s entitlement under his notional account is the same fixed, formula-
based amount of $102 even as the value of the bond spikes due to lower 
interest rates.  Under the Act, any investment gain from falling interest 
rates inures to the Trust and its collective pool, not to any account holder.  
The board may elect to retroactively allocate some or all of this gain to 
participants’ accounts or may for the following year increase the stated 
investment return to reflect the prior year’s increase in the Trust’s assets.  
But the board need not do so. 
  Even if the board takes these retroactive steps, there will be no 
direct link between the Trust’s investment performance and participants’ 
account balances.  Under the California Act, any connection between 
investment performance and account balances is mediated by the board 
through its selection of a stated rate of return and the board’s decision 
whether or not to credit to accounts the Trust’s “excess” earnings.  At the 
end of the day, there is a significant difference between an individual 
retirement account, the value of which is tied directly and automatically to 
investment gains and losses, and a formula-driven account under the Act, 
which is not linked directly or automatically to investment gains or losses. 
  A second rebuttal to the conclusion that the accounts created by 
the Act are not individual retirement accounts under the Code would assert 
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that the definition of “account” is different for IRAs than for defined 
contribution plans, such as money purchase pensions and profit sharing 
arrangements.  If so, Code § 414(i)159 and the case law decided under it are 
irrelevant to IRAs. 
  However, Code § 414(i) is, by its terms, applicable, not only to 
money purchase and profit sharing plans, but to § 408160 as well; § 414(i) 
applies to the “part” of the Code that includes § 408.161 As a textual matter, 
the term “account” in § 408 is most plausibly read to mean the same thing 
for IRAs as for other defined contribution plans covered by the same part 
of the Code, i.e., a retirement account where investment gain and loss 
automatically and directly inure to the benefit (or detriment) of the account 
holder. 
 A third challenge, related to the second, would assert that, in the 
context of IRAs, it is not in practice important to define rigorously the 
concept of an “account.”  In the context of employer-sponsored retirement 
plans, the distinction between defined contribution/individual account 
plans and defined benefit pensions is crucial for many purposes.  For 
example, employers guarantee the benefits promised under defined benefit 
pensions but do not guarantee outcomes under individual account plans.162 
Congress has imposed limits on the employer stock a defined benefit 
arrangement may own, but has levied no equivalent restrictions on defined 
contribution plans.163 There are different vesting schedules for defined 
contribution and defined benefit plans.164 In these and other settings, it is 
                                                         
159 I.R.C. § 414(i) (2006). 
160 I.R.C. § 408 (2006). 
161 That part of the Code is Part I of Subchapter D which extends from Code § 
401 through Code § 420, inclusive, and thus includes Code § 408, governing IRAs. 
See I.R.C. §§ 401-420 (2006). 
162 Despite its relatively narrow focus, Justice Stevens’ Nachman opinion is 
generally cited as confirming that employers guarantee defined benefit pensions. 
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U.S. 359 (1980). As 
a statutory matter, it is today the minimum funding rules and the PBGC insurance 
arrangement which lock employers into the defined benefit commitments they 
make. I.R.C. §§ 412, 430, 431, 436, 4971 (2006); ERISA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 1081 
(2006) (minimum funding rules); ERISA § 4062, 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) 
(sponsoring employers liability to PBGC in case of distress termination). 
163 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006). 
164 Compare I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A) (2006), and 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A) 
(2006) (vesting schedules for defined benefit plans), with I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(B) 
(2006), and 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B) (2006) (vesting schedules for defined 
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critical to determine which plans have “accounts” and which do not.  
However, the argument would conclude, there are no similar consequences 
in the context of individual retirement accounts and thus no need to define 
such accounts with particular rigor. 
 However, the term “account” does play an important role in the 
context of individual retirement arrangements as the Code distinguishes 
individual retirement accounts from individual retirement annuities: such 
annuities can only be issued by insurance companies complying with state 
regulation of insurance.165 It is, moreover, unconvincing to read the term 
“account” differently at different places within the same statute.  Code § 
408 was enacted as part of ERISA, which simultaneously embedded the 
definition of an account in both Code § 414 and the labor, i.e., Title 29, 
version of ERISA.  
 A fourth argument would contend that California could defend the 
Act in its current form by asserting that the Act’s notional accounts fall 
within the Code’s authorization of individual retirement annuities.  If the 
Act’s notional accounts can, for purposes of the Code, be characterized as 
such annuities, then it is unnecessary for those accounts to comply with the 
Code and ERISA requirement that accounts allocate investment gains and 
losses to account holders.  
  It is no accident that the drafters and sponsors of the Act elected 
to characterize the participants’ interests in the California program as 
“accounts.”  By labeling those interests as “accounts,” the proponents of 
the Act appealed to the broad public acceptance of the now-established 
defined contribution paradigm with its emphasis on account-based 
ownership devices166 such as 401(k) accounts,167 individual retirement 
accounts,168 Section 529 accounts,169 and health savings accounts.170 In 
contrast, despite the persuasive argument for annuities as savings and 
retirement devices,171 such annuities do not resonate the same way with the 
public today.  Would a majority of the Golden State’s legislators have been 
                                                         
contribution plans). 
165 I.R.C. § 408(b) (2006). 
166 Zelinsky, supra note 66, at 31-37. 
167 Id. at 49-52. 
168 Id. at 52-58. 
169 Id. at 64-69. 
170 Id. at 62-64. 
171 Id. at 15-23; TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT 
AGAINST PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 122-25 (2008). 
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willing to impose mandatory “annuities” on their constituents?  I’m 
skeptical.  Framing matters.172 
 Against this background, it is unpersuasive for California to call 
the notional accounts created in the Act “accounts” when addressing the 
California populace through the Golden State’s statute books while 
simultaneously telling the IRS, the DOL, and, ultimately, the courts that 
these “accounts” are really “annuities” under the Code. 
 Moreover, if the Act’s accounts are individual retirement annuities 
for purposes of the Code, those putative annuities cannot be offered by the 
Trust created under the Act.  As a statutory matter, individual retirement 
annuities must be underwritten by insurance companies, complying with 
the state’s statutes and regulations pertaining to insurance.173 However, the 
Trust is not required to comply with the insurance statutes and regulations 
of the Golden State.174 
 Just as the defenders of the Act might be tempted in ipse dixit 
fashion to declare the Act’s accounts as annuities, they might also be 
tempted to proclaim arbitrarily that the Trust is an insurance company even 
though the Trust need not comply with the same rules as apply to 
commercial and nonprofit insurers operating in the Golden State.175 Such a 
formalistic, indeed hollow, relabeling of the Trust as an insurance 
company would be unpersuasive.  The evident purpose of the statutory 
                                                         
172 Scholars today give much attention to “framing effects.” At one level, the 
research on framing effects itself reframes the long-recognized reality that it 
matters how issues are defined. For contemporary research on framing effects, see 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer 
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and The Paradox of Tax Expenditure 
Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797, 807-11 (2005); Edward J. McCaffery & Joel 
Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance, in BEHAVORIAL 
PUBLIC FINANCE 3, 7-8 (Edward J. McCaffery and Joel Slemrod eds., 2006). For a 
classic instance of an astute politician who understood what we today call framing 
effects in the context of retirement policy, see ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 113 
(discussing Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to finance Social Security through 
payroll taxes so “no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program.”). 
173 See I.R.C. § 408(b) (2006) (individual retirement annuities must be “issued 
by an insurance company”); Treas. Reg. § 1.408-3(a) (1986) (individual retirement 
annuities must be “issued by an insurance company which is qualified to do 
business under the law of the jurisdiction in which the contract is sold.”); see 
generally CAL. INS. CODe. 
174 See generally CAL. INS. CODE. 
175 Id. 
580      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
requirement of Code § 408(b) is to assure the holders of individual 
retirement annuities that those annuities receive the substantive protections 
of state insurance law.  That purpose is eviscerated if an entity, like the 
Trust, is by ipse dixit declared to be an insurance company while relieved 
of the substantive requirements governing all other insurers.  
 At the end of the day, California’s legislature elected to 
characterize the Act’s accounts as accounts rather than as annuities and 
chose to offer those accounts through a state-sponsored Trust rather than 
through insurance companies complying with California’s insurance laws.  
California should be held to those choices.  And the notional accounts 
created by the Act do not qualify as individual retirement accounts since 
they do not allocate gains and losses to account holders.176 
 Yet a fifth challenge to my conclusion that the Act’s accounts are 
not individual retirement accounts would dispute the similarity of the 
California program to a cash balance-style defined benefit plan.  If the 
assets funding a cash balance pension are inadequate to pay promised 
benefits, the sponsoring employer is liable for the shortfall.177 However, 
California has explicitly disclaimed responsibility for any liabilities of the 
Trust or the program178 – a disclaimer not available to the private sector 
sponsor of a defined benefit plan.  Similarly, if there are surplus assets in a 
cash balance plan when the plan terminates, these assets may revert to the 
sponsoring employer.179 
 An analogy need not be perfect to be persuasive.  Even if we take 
at face value California’s declaration that the Golden State’s treasury does 
not stand behind the Trust and the program,180 the accounts to be 
established under the Act are notional in nature.  Like a participant in a 
cash balance pension, a participant in the California program will have a 
formula-based claim against the Trust rather than a true individual account 
under which investment gains automatically flow through to the 
                                                         
176 As I discuss infra, another state (or even California itself) could pursue a 
different course from the Act by openly declaring that private sector employees 
otherwise without work-based retirement savings coverage must purchase 
individual retirement annuities. See infra note 247 and accompanying text. 
177 See ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 14. 
178 S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 100013, 100014(c)(3), and 100036 (2012)). 
179 Subject to the potential reversion tax of I.R.C. § 4980 (2006). 
180 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100013, 
100014(c)(3), and 100036 (2012)). 
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participant’s account and losses reduce the participant’s account balance.  
 The Act is silent as to the distribution of surplus assets if the Trust 
were to terminate in overfunded condition.  Perhaps the Trust’s extra funds 
would be distributed to present and/or former participants in the program. 
Or perhaps these surplus assets would go to the California treasury in a 
manner analogous to a reversion to an employer sponsoring a defined 
benefit plan.  We don’t know.  In any event, the program and its accounts 
need not perfectly mimic a private sector cash balance pension for such a 
pension to be the most useful analogy.  That is the case, given the cash 
balance-style, formula-based entitlement of account holders under the 
California Act.  
 A sixth argument is that there is no policy reason to deny 
individual retirement account status to the accounts to be established under 
the Act. A believer in the ownership society would disagree, arguing that 
true individual accounts correspond with cultural norms about ownership 
and give the account holder a direct stake in the American economy as a 
result of his unmediated participation in the upside and downside of 
investment performance.181 
 Had the 93rd Congress foreseen the possibility of cash balance 
accounts, it might have drafted Code § 408 to include within the definition 
of an individual retirement account the kind of defined benefit, notional 
account established under the California Act.  But Congress did not.  It is 
anachronistic to blame Congress for this omission (assuming it was an 
omission) because the cash balance plan was far in the future and could not 
have been anticipated in 1974.  It is, moreover, not apparent that, had the 
drafters foreseen the possibility of formula-based cash balance accounts, 
they would have included them within the definition of individual 
retirement accounts for purposes of Code § 408.  In any event, Congress 
did not draft Code § 408 in a way which qualifies cash balance accounts as 
individual retirement accounts since cash balance accounts are formula-
based and do not allocate investment gains and losses directly to 
participants’ respective accounts.  
 Consider finally my argument that the private insurance the Act 
authorizes the board to purchase is analogous to the insurance the PBGC 
issues to defined benefit pension plans to protect against the underfunding 
of promised benefits.  This similarity, I argue, indicates that the accounts 
authorized by the California Act are defined benefit devices, insurable like 
                                                         
181 ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 97-101. 
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defined benefit pensions, and thus outside the statutory definition of an 
individual retirement account: insurance is only needed against the risk of 
underfunding when underfunding can occur.  Defined contribution 
accounts cannot be underfunded since account holders are entitled to 
whatever their respective accounts are worth, based on actual investment 
performance. 
 The counterargument is that the insurance authorized by the Act is 
similar to an insurance-type product purchased inside an individual 
retirement account.  Such accounts, for example, can invest in guaranteed 
income contracts (GIC), which, the argument goes, are similar to the 
insurance the board can buy under the Act. 
 The controlling difference is the nature of the claim created by an 
insurance-type product inside an individual retirement account, as opposed 
to insurance protecting a formula-based benefit.  When an individual 
retirement account is invested in a GIC or similar device, the account 
holder’s entitlement is defined and limited by that contract.  If the insurer 
or other financial institution issuing the GIC defaults, the account holder 
has no further claim against the account.  The GIC (or similar insurance-
type device) is an investment like a bond or stock: if the GIC goes belly-
up, the loss falls on the individual account holder. 
 However, the insurance to be purchased under the Act is designed 
to guarantee a cash balance-style defined benefit formula, i.e., the 
employees’ contributions increased by a stated rate of return, unreduced by 
investment losses.  If the issuer of the insurance acquired by the board 
defaults, the account holder still has a claim against the Trust for his 
formula-based benefit.  Again, the analogy, while not perfect, is 
instructive. The insurance to be purchased by the California board 
underwrites a cash balance-style benefit just as the PBGC issues insurance 
to protect the equivalent formula-based promises made by defined benefit 
plans.    
 
D. SUMMARY 
 
 In sum, the Act imposes investment reward and risk on the Trust 
and the collective funds the Trust will hold.  The cash balance-style 
accounts created by the Act are proclaimed by the Act to be “accounts.” 
However, these notional accounts are not individual retirement accounts 
since the account holder has a formula-based defined benefit-type interest 
in his account and does not himself benefit directly from good investment 
performance or suffer from poor investment performance. 
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VII. NO ERISA PREEMPTION UNDER TRAVELERS OF THE ACT’S 
EMPLOYER MANDATE  
 
 Under the Act, the board can only implement the program if the 
accounts implementing the program qualify as individual retirement 
accounts under the Code.182 This caveat reflects the drafters’ intent for the 
program to qualify as an IRA payroll deduction arrangement, subject to 
state regulation because such an arrangement is not an employee benefit 
plan for ERISA purposes.183 This caveat also assures the participants in the 
program that they will receive the tax benefits associated with IRAs.184 
 Because the accounts established under the Act are not individual 
retirement accounts, the most compelling course for California’s 
legislature would be to abandon the cash balance-style formula currently 
embedded in the Act by amending the Act to recast the accounts to be 
offered by the program as true individual retirement accounts which assign 
investment risk and reward directly to the participating employees.  It is 
thus necessary to consider whether, if the Act were so amended,185 the 
Act’s employer mandate would be ERISA preempted. Shaw says “yes” 
while Travelers says “no.”  Travelers, as the Court’s more recent and more 
compelling construction of § 514(a) and ERISA preemption, should 
control and should thus protect the employer mandate of the California Act 
from ERISA preemption – if the Act’s accounts are reformulated as bona 
fide individual retirement accounts.  
 The Act’s employer mandate explicitly refers to employer-
sponsored retirement plans, exempting from the mandate all Golden State 
employers who sponsor such plans.186 Under the unforgiving Shaw test 
(“connection with or reference to”), ERISA § 514(a) preempts the Act’s 
employer mandate since that mandate refers to employers’ retirement plans 
by exempting from the mandate employers sponsoring retirement plans for 
                                                         
182 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100013, 
100014(c)(3), 100036 (2012)).  
183 29 C.F.R. §2510.3-2(d) (2007). 
184 I.R.C. §§ 219, 408(e)(1) and 408A(d)(1) (2006). 
185 In order for the program accounts established under the Act to qualify as 
individual retirement accounts, it is also necessary for the Trust to satisfy the IRS 
that the Trust will be administered in a fashion “consistent with the requirements 
of” I.R.C. § 408. See I.R.C. § 408(a)(2) (2006). It should not be difficult for the 
Trust to satisfy this standard. See Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(e) (1986). 
186 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(d) (2012)). 
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their respective workforces. 
 Consider in this context the last of the Shaw line of cases, District 
of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade.187 In that case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court declared as ERISA-preempted a District of Columbia 
law requiring employers to provide to injured employees receiving 
workers’ compensation the same health insurance employers provide to 
their active workers.  Since employer-provided medical coverage 
constitutes an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan,188 the Court held, 
the D.C. law impermissibly “refer[red] to” such ERISA-regulated 
employee benefit plans by requiring that injured employees receive the 
same medical coverage as furnished by the ERISA-regulated employee 
benefit plans in effect for active employees. 
 The application of Greater Washington Board of Trade to the 
California Act’s employer mandate is straightforward: like the D.C. statute 
the Court held to be preempted, the California Act explicitly refers to 
employers’ ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans, exempting from the 
obligation to participate in the Act’s state-sponsored withholding program 
any employer which maintains a retirement plan for its employees.189 Thus, 
under the unforgiving Shaw test (“reference to”), the Act’s employer 
mandate is ERISA-preempted as the mandate refers to employer-sponsored 
retirement plans by exempting employers maintaining such plans – just as 
the District of Columbia statute referred to employer-sponsored medical 
plans for active employees as the standard for medical coverage to be 
provided to injured employees. 
 Travelers, however, undermines Shaw.  Under Travelers’ approach 
to § 514(a), the Act’s employer mandate is not ERISA-preempted.  
Underlying Travelers’ approach to ERISA § 514(a) are a variety of themes 
which cannot be reconciled with Shaw: the interpretation of § 514(a) in 
any situation, Travelers declares, starts with the “presumption that 
Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”190 The legislative purpose 
animating ERISA’s preemption provision was “to avoid a multiplicity of 
[state] regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration 
of employee benefit plans.”191 Such national uniformity is particularly at 
risk when a state law dictates “employee benefit structures or their 
                                                         
187 506 U.S. 125 (1992). See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 826. 
188 29 U.S.C. 1002(1) (2006). 
189 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(d) (2012)). 
190 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654. 
191 Id. at 646. 
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administration”192 or provides “alternative enforcement mechanisms.”193 A 
state law is not ERISA-preempted under § 514(a) merely because of its 
“indirect economic influence” on employee benefit plans.194 Starting from 
these Travelers premises, the Act’s employer mandate is not ERISA-
preempted because there is a presumption that Congress preferred not to 
supplant the Act, the Act’s employer mandate has no effect on employers 
maintaining their own retirement plans for their employees, and the Act’s 
mandate does not impair national uniformity in the administration or 
content of employer-sponsored retirement plans.  Indeed, the Act says 
nothing about such administration or content. 
 To explore further the contrast between Shaw and Travelers, 
consider the Supreme Court’s first ERISA preemption decision after 
Travelers, California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.195 Separately-funded apprenticeship 
programs are ERISA-regulated employee welfare plans.196 On public 
construction projects, California law permits contractors to pay lower than 
prevailing wages to apprentices only if the state approves the 
apprenticeship program.  Under Shaw, this California statute refers to and 
has a connection with ERISA-governed welfare plans, namely separately-
funded apprenticeship programs.  Hence, applying Shaw, the California 
wage law should be preempted under ERISA § 514(a). 
 However, following Travelers, the Dillingham Court sustained the 
California wage statute as that statute merely had an “indirect economic 
influence”197 on ERISA-regulated apprenticeship programs in the Golden 
State.  The impact of the California law was “quite remote”198 from 
concerns about plan benefits and plan administration.  Hence, the 
Dillingham Court declared, ERISA did not preempt the California statute 
challenged in that case. Dillingham thus buttresses the conclusion that, 
under Travelers’ more forgiving approach, the Act’s employer mandate is 
not ERISA-preempted. 
 While less sweeping than Shaw, post-Travelers ERISA preemption 
still has substantial bite in particular cases.  In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex. rel. 
                                                         
192 Id. at 658 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 659. 
195 519 U.S. 316 (1997). 
196 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006). 
197 Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 329. 
198 Id. at 330. 
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Breiner,199 for example, the Court held that § 514(a) prevents the 
application to any ERISA-governed employee benefit plan of a 
Washington State statute that, on a participant’s divorce, automatically 
revokes any beneficiary designation of the participant’s former spouse.  
The Washington law, the Egelhoff Court declared, “interferes with 
nationally uniform plan administration” of ERISA-regulated plans200 by 
requiring an employee benefit plan operating in Washington State to 
disregard a beneficiary designation on file with such plan if the designation 
names a former spouse as beneficiary.  
In contrast, the Act has no impact on California employers 
maintaining retirement plans or payroll deduction IRA arrangements.  
These employers can with impunity ignore the Act, the Trust, and the 
program.  The Act does not regulate the content or processes of a 
California employer’s retirement plan or an employer’s IRA payroll 
deduction arrangement.  If a California employer is required to enroll in 
the program (assuming the Act is amended to qualify the Act’s accounts as 
individual retirement accounts), the employer will thereby participate in a 
program which is not an employee benefit plan for ERISA purposes: 
California’s state-sponsored program (assuming amendment of the Act) 
will qualify as a payroll deduction IRA arrangement which is not an 
employee benefit plan under ERISA.201  
 For ERISA preemption purposes, the Act (if amended to establish 
bona fide individual retirement accounts) is more like the California 
apprentice wage statute sustained in Dillingham than the Washington State 
divorce-related law stricken in Egelhoff.  The latter unacceptably impinged 
upon the administration of ERISA-regulated plans by requiring 
                                                         
199 532 U.S. 141 (2001). For discussion of Egelhoff, see Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Employer Mandates and ERISA Preemption: A Critique of Golden Gate 
Restaurant Association v. San Francisco, 50 STATE TAX NOTES 503, 512 (2008) 
(hereinafter Zelinsky, Golden Gate II); Edward A. Zelinsky, Egelhoff, ERISA 
Preemption and the Conundrum of the `Relate To' Clause, 91 TAX NOTES 1917 
(2001). 
200 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148. 
201 By way of contrast, an employer subject to the employer mandate of the 
San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance must provide specific health care 
benefits under its own, ERISA-regulated program, or, in the alternative, must 
participate in the City’s Health Access Program (HAP), which establishes an 
ERISA-governed health care program. See Zelinsky, Golden Gate II, supra note 
199, at 4-7. 
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administrators to run their respective plans in accordance with Washington 
State law rather than the pre-divorce beneficiary designations on file with 
the plan.  The California Act, in contrast, does not impinge upon 
employers’ retirement plans or such plans’ operations.  The Act just 
requires employers without such plans or IRA withholding arrangements to 
participate in a state-sponsored IRA withholding program, a program 
which is not an employee benefit plan for ERISA purposes.202  
 As the Court’s later and more persuasive203 interpretation of 
ERISA preemption, Travelers should prevail over Shaw. Thus, the Act’s 
employer mandate should survive ERISA preemption if the Act’s accounts 
are recast as individual retirement accounts.  Per Travelers, the Act has no 
direct effect on employers’ retirement plans and does not affect the content 
or administration of such plans.  The Act will merely require employers 
without retirement plans to maintain their own IRA payroll arrangements 
or to participate in the California program, a publicly-administered IRA 
payroll arrangement which is not an employee benefit plan for ERISA 
purposes.   
  
VIII. NO ERISA PREEMPTION OF EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS 
UNDER TRAVELERS 
 
 Similar observations apply as to the provisions of the Act 
authorizing employers to make voluntary contributions204 to employees’ 
program accounts: under Shaw, this portion of the Act is ERISA-
preempted, but, under Travelers, the Act’s authorization of optional 
employer contributions survives § 514(a) scrutiny.  Travelers is the Court’s 
later and more compelling interpretation of § 514(a) and thus should spare 
from ERISA preemption the Act’s authorization of supplemental employer 
contributions.  The Act neither requires employers to make contributions 
nor requires employers to affirmatively elect against such contributions. 
 The employer who makes voluntary contributions under the Act to 
employees’ accounts will, by virtue of such contributions, convert the 
                                                         
202 29 CFR § 2510.3-2(d) (2010). 
203 Despite these rulings the author continues to believe that there is an 
interpretation of ERISA § 514(a) which is better than either Shaw or Travelers, 
namely, to treat § 514(a) as creating a rebuttable presumption of ERISA 
preemption. See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 839-58. 
204 S.B. 1234, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 100004(e) and 100012(j) (2012)). 
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program for such contributing employer from a payroll deduction IRA 
arrangement into an ERISA-regulated employee benefit pension plan. 
Payroll deduction IRA arrangements retain that classification only if the 
employees make all contributions pursuant to such arrangements.205 If a 
California employer makes contributions under the program, the program 
would for ERISA purposes thereby become an employee pension plan for 
that employer, an employer-financed plan which both “provides retirement 
income to employees”206 and which “results in a deferral of income by 
employees.”207 Employers making supplemental contributions to 
employees’ accounts under the Act would need to comply with the rules 
for either a simplified employee pension208 (SEP) or a simple retirement 
account209 (SRA).  Either way, an employer’s contributions to the program 
would result for that employer in a pension plan for ERISA purposes, an 
employer-financed arrangement providing retirement income and deferring 
income.210 
 Shaw preempts the Act insofar as the Act would take California 
employers down the path of employer contributions.  As to contributing 
employers, the state-run program and the Trust will be an ERISA-governed 
pension plan because of such employers’ contributions to the program. 
Under Shaw and its nearly automatic standard for ERISA preemption, the 
Act would have the ultimate “connection with” an ERISA-regulated 
employee benefit plan: the Act would create such a plan whenever 
employers make supplemental contributions to employees’ accounts as 
                                                         
205 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d) (2010). 
206 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
207 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
208 I.R.C. § 408(k) (2006). S.B. 1234 adds to the Government Code § 
100010(b), which requires the board to promulgate regulations “to ensure that the 
program meets all criteria for federal tax-deferral or tax-exempt benefits, or both.” 
S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100010(b) (2012)).  This 
statutory requirement would mandate regulations qualifying voluntary employer 
contributions under the program to take the form of either simplified employee 
pensions or simple retirement accounts. 
209 I.R.C. § 408(p) (2006). 
210 While governmental plans are largely immune from regulation under 
ERISA, the program created under the Act is not a governmental plan for purposes 
of ERISA since the program covers employees in the private and nonprofit sectors, 
not the employees of governments. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1974)  (defining 
governmental plans as covering government employees); 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) 
(1974) (stating that Title I of ERISA does not apply to governmental plans). 
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such employers’ contributions under the Act would, for ERISA purposes, 
convert their payroll deduction arrangements into employee benefit plans. 
 Consider in this context the Supreme Court’s Shaw-based decision 
in FMC Corp. v. Holliday.211 In FMC Corp., the Court held that ERISA § 
514(a) preempts Pennsylvania’s anti-subrogation law from applying to 
self-insured212 welfare plans.  If, as FMC Corp. holds, a state law 
regulating employee benefit plans impermissibly “relate[s] to”213 the plans 
the law regulates, a fortiori a state law that creates employee benefit plans 
is similarly ERISA-preempted as relating to the plans it creates.  Hence, 
under the Shaw framework, the California Act, insofar as it establishes an 
ERISA-governed pension plan for employers’ contributions, has an 
impermissible “connection with”214 the employee pension plans the Act 
thereby establishes.  
 Again, however, the Travelers approach to ERISA-preemption is 
more forgiving, permitting state laws which have “indirect economic 
effects” on employers’ retirement plans as long as such laws do not impair 
the nationally uniform content or administration of such plans.  The Act’s 
authorization of supplemental employer contributions does not impair 
national uniformity in the structure or administration of employee benefit 
plans.  Any California employer can ignore the Act’s authorization of 
optional employer contributions.  The Act thus has no impact, indirect or 
otherwise, on such employers. 
 In two respects, Egelhoff is instructive in this context and confirms 
that, under the more forgiving approach to ERISA preemption inaugurated 
in Travelers, the provisions of the California Act authorizing supplemental 
employer contributions are distinguishable for ERISA preemption 
purposes from the Washington State statute the Court struck in Egelhoff.  
First, writing for the Egelhoff Court, Justice Thomas observed of the 
Washington State statute revoking beneficiary designations on divorce that 
“[u]niformity is impossible . . . if plans are subject to different legal 
obligations in different states.”215 In contrast, the California Act’s 
authorization of voluntary employee contributions imposes no “legal 
obligations” on any California employer, as the Act does not require a 
                                                         
211 498 U.S. 52 (1990). See Zelinsky, supra note 91, at 822-23. 
212 The Pennsylvania law survived preemption as to insured ERISA plans as a 
permitted regulation of insurance. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 60. 
213 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
214 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). 
215 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001). 
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California employer to make contributions.  The Act simply permits 
supplemental contributions by an employer that elects to make such 
optional contributions.  No California employer is legally obligated to 
make voluntary contributions – unlike the Washington State employers in 
Egelhoff who were legally required to follow that state’s law revoking 
beneficiary designations of former spouses. 
 Second, an employer in Washington State can elect “to opt out”216 
of the Washington State statute revoking beneficiary designations on 
divorce.  As Justice Thomas pointed out, this “opt out” option, if replicated 
by other states, would threaten nationally uniform administration of 
ERISA-regulated plans by requiring an interstate employer to opt out state-
by-state.  Thus, if the Washington State statute at issue in Egelhoff were 
reproduced nationwide, “the burden” of opting out of each state’s statute 
would be “hardly trivial”.217 As to the Washington law, 
  
[i]t is not enough for plan administrators to opt out of this 
particular statute.  Instead, they must maintain a familiarity 
with the laws of all 50 States so that they can update their 
plans as necessary to satisfy the opt-out requirements of 
other, similar statutes.218 
 
 In contrast, a California employer need not elect against 
supplementary contributions under the Golden State’s Act.  A California 
employer who is ignorant of the optional contributions authorized by the 
Act suffers no consequences.  A nationwide employer could similarly 
ignore the voluntary employer contributions permitted by any other state 
statute modeled on the California Act.  An employer need not “opt out” of 
a statute when compliance with that statute is voluntary – as is compliance 
with the California Act’s provisions permitting, but not requiring, 
supplementary employer contributions. 
 Thus, at the end of the day, whether ERISA preempts the 
California Act’s authorization of optional employer contributions depends 
(as does the ERISA preemption status of the Act’s employer mandate) 
upon the standard used to interpret ERISA § 514(a).  Under the older, more 
sweeping Shaw test (“reference to or connection with”), ERISA 
                                                         
216 Id. at 150. 
217 Id. at 151. 
218 Id. 
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preemption of state law is nearly automatic.  By authorizing optional 
employer contributions, the California Act connects with employers’ 
ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans by creating such plans when 
employers make optional contributions.  Shaw thus counsels that § 514(a) 
preempts the Act’s authorization of voluntary employer contributions as 
such employer contributions would convert the program created under the 
Act from an IRA payroll deduction arrangement without employer 
contributions into an ERISA-regulated employee pension plan with such 
contributions. 
 However, Travelers’ more forgiving approach to ERISA 
preemption protects the Act’s authorization of supplemental employer 
contributions under § 514(a).  The California Act neither obligates 
employers to make voluntary contributions nor requires employers to 
affirmatively reject an obligation to make such contributions.  Thus, the 
Act’s authorization of optional employer contributions survives under the 
Supreme Court’s more recent and more persuasive articulation of ERISA 
preemption in Travelers: employer contributions convert the program into 
an employee pension plan for ERISA purposes, but the Act imposes no 
obligations on employers which, under the more forgiving standards of 
Travelers, would trigger ERISA preemption. 
Just as it is necessary to amend the Act to convert its notional, cash 
balance-style accounts into individual retirement accounts, it is also 
necessary to amend the Act’s prohibition on supplementary employer 
contributions if such contributions “cause the program to be treated as an 
employee benefit plan under” ERISA.219 The drafters of this provision 
evidently concluded that, if employer contributions convert the Golden 
State’s program into an employee benefit plan for ERISA purposes, ERISA 
preemption necessarily follows.  
 Travelers points to a different conclusion: even though for ERISA 
purposes employer contributions convert the California program into an 
employee benefit plan for the employers making such optional 
contributions, the Act is not ERISA-preempted under Travelers.  The 
employer contributions authorized under the Act are purely voluntary.  The 
Act imposes no burden on California employers with respect to their 
retirement plans or with respect to the design or administration of their 
retirement plans.  Hence, per Travelers, ERISA does not prohibit employer 
                                                         
219 See CAL. GOV’T CODE §100004(e) (2012); CAL. GOV’T CODE §100012(k) 
(2012). 
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contributions under the program, even though such contributions convert 
the program to an employee pension plan for ERISA purposes.  The Act 
should accordingly be amended to delete the Act’s current requirement that 
employer contributions be suspended if they would “cause the program to 
be treated as an employee benefit plan under” ERISA.   
 
IX.  OTHER CHOICES 
 
 The foregoing analysis indicates that the Act would survive 
ERISA-preemption under Travelers were the Act amended to recast the 
California program’s accounts as individual retirement accounts which 
allocate investment reward and loss to the individual account holder.  If the 
Act were so amended, an employer’s withholding under the California 
program would qualify as an IRA payroll deduction arrangement which is, 
for ERISA purposes, not an employee benefit plan since only amounts 
withheld from the employees’ wages would be paid to the Trust.  If any 
California employers make optional contributions under the Act, for those 
contributing employers, the program would become an employee pension 
plan, but would survive ERISA-preemption under Travelers.  Under the 
older and tougher Shaw standard, the Act’s employer mandate is ERISA-
preempted, whether or not the employer makes supplementary 
contributions under the program.  However, Travelers is the Court’s later 
and more compelling construction of ERISA § 514(a);220 the Act, if 
amended to convert its formula-based notional accounts into individual 
retirement accounts, should survive ERISA preemption under Travelers 
since the Act would impose no obligations or burdens on employers and 
their retirement plans. 
 That the Act, as amended, would be legal does not mean that the 
Act, as amended, would be sound policy.  In this final section, I outline 
some of the alternatives available to a state legislature (or a Congress) that 
contemplates following California’s lead in encouraging retirement 
savings.  
 Any such outline starts with the fact that there is, as the Act’s 
advocates observe, a serious problem, namely the failure of moderate and 
low-income workers to save for retirement.  Some critics of the California 
                                                         
220 However, I continue to believe that there is a better approach to ERISA § 
514(a) than either Shaw or Travelers, namely, construing § 514(a) as creating a 
presumption of preemption. See Zelinsky, supra note 102, at 839-58. 
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Act portray the Act as an effort to grab private savings to rescue 
underfunded pensions for public employees. 221 Even if that is so, the Act 
on its face is aimed at a real shortcoming in our national retirement system. 
Our defined contribution culture places the burden of retirement saving on 
the worker himself.  Most low- and moderately-paid workers save little or 
nothing for retirement.222 
 Other commentators on the Act raise the opposite fear, namely that 
California’s taxpayers will be seen as implicitly guaranteeing the cash 
balance-style defined benefits promised to participating employees under 
the Act in its current form.223 From this vantage, the ultimate risk down the 
road is not using private retirement savings to rescue public pensions, but 
requiring the public treasury to make good future underfunding of the 
notional, cash balance-style accounts created under the Act. 
 Both risks are mitigated if, as I urge, the Act’s current notional, 
cash balance accounts are changed to true individual accounts which 
allocate directly investment risk and reward to the employee/account 
holders.  If the Act’s accounts are converted to individual retirement 
accounts, there would be no underfunding for California’s taxpayers to 
finance since an individual retirement account holder is simply entitled to 
his or her account’s current total, whatever that total may be in light of 
investment gains and losses.  Moreover, it would be more difficult 
politically for a future legislature to divert funds from a Trust consisting of 
accounts under which each account holder, as an individual retirement 
account owner, has a claim for his particular investment-based balance 
rather than a fixed, formula-based benefit.  As noted above, framing 
                                                         
221 See, e.g., Mimi Walters, The Government Seizure of Private Retirement 
Plans, FOX & HOUNDS (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.foxandhoundsdaily.com/2012/ 
09/the-government-seizure-of-private-retirement (“SB 1234 looks like nothing 
more than a cynical effort to prop up the floundering public employee pension debt 
with new funds from private investors . . . .”). 
222 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 26-27; FROLIK AND MOORE, supra note 
103, at 5; see DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 5, at 124; see also S.B. 1234, 
2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100008(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE 
(2012)). (“[O]ver 6.3 million California workers, 75 percent of whom earn less 
than $50,000 per year, do not have access to retirement savings opportunities 
through their jobs.”). 
223 Keegan, supra note 86; Danker, supra note 86; Lin, supra note 86; 
DeLeon, supra note 87. 
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matters.224 And it would matter to an account holder if his balance were 
reduced by a future legislature’s diversion of assets to buttress public 
employees’ pension plans. 
 Not every problem has a solution nor is the solution to every 
problem a statute or a public program.  However, the supporters of the Act 
raise a compelling concern when they point to the systematic failure of less 
affluent workers to save adequately for retirement. 
 I conclude that, in this area, Brandeisian experimentation225 by the 
states is desirable, both to test different models (including the model of no 
state action) and to respond to different preferences (including a preference 
for no state action).226 
 To take one example, automatic enrollment is an area where state-
by-state experimentation could prove productive.  It is plausible for the 
California Act to let workers opt out of the program’s coverage.  If a low- 
or moderate-income worker finds her current cash needs too pressing to 
make retirement savings, that is a regrettable decision with long-term costs, 
though it is reasonable to let the worker make that decision for herself.  On 
the other hand, if a state legislature with more paternalistic instincts were 
to make retirement savings mandatory with no ability to opt out, the 
resulting experiment might produce useful information.  While I am 
skeptical of such paternalism, a preference for state experimentation entails 
an openness to experiments about which one is not particularly 
enthusiastic. 
 At the other end of the spectrum, an equally plausible choice is for 
states to continue to do nothing about the problem of private retirement 
savings.  There is a vigorous market in retirement products, plans, and 
services;227 the federal government gives tax credits to both small 
                                                         
224 See sources cited supra note 172. 
225 The classic statement of the states as laboratories for experimentation is 
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932). 
226 My predisposition for state experimentation leads me to skepticism about 
ERISA preemption, which, even under Travelers, emphasizes national uniformity. 
See Zelinsky, supra note 102, at 865-68; Zelinsky, Golden Gate II, supra note 199, 
at 514. 
227 Indeed, the financial services industry has been the sales force for the 
defined contribution paradigm, providing services, investments and plans. 
Zelinsky, supra note 66, at 51-52, 96-97. 
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employers establishing qualified plans228 and to low-income individuals 
undertaking retirement savings.229 A state legislator concerned about the 
negligible retirement savings of rank-and-file workers could reasonably 
conclude that these market-based alternatives and federal tax credits 
occupy the field to the exclusion of any state-based policies. 
 Alternatively, that legislator could conclude that the state, instead 
of enacting a California-style Act, should supplement the federal tax 
credits for employers and workers with state tax credits, just as some states 
supplement the federal earned income tax credit230 with an additional state 
tax credit on earned income.231 Or that legislator could instead define the 
problem as lack of knowledge and conclude that the appropriate state 
policy is to publicize the federal tax credits for small employers 
establishing qualified plans and for low-income workers who save for their 
respective retirements.232 
 Among the interesting features of the California Act is the 
prospect233 (some would say, inevitability)234 that CalPERS, the state 
pension plan for the Golden State’s public employees, will invest part or 
all of the funds held by the Trust for private sector workers.  If the 
legislature proceeds with the Trust retaining the Act’s notional, cash 
balance-style accounts, having a state pension fund take responsibility for 
the Trust’s investments increases the risk that a future legislature will be 
compelled to use taxpayer funds to cure any shortfall.  Even though the 
California legislature has explicitly disclaimed any state guarantee of the 
program’s accounts,235 if CalPERS (or another public agency) oversees the 
investment of employees’ withheld wages, at least some participants in the 
                                                         
228 I.R.C. § 45E (2006). 
229 I.R.C. § 25B (2006). 
230 I.R.C. § 32 (2006). 
231 See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 606(d) (McKinney 2014); Marc Heller, State 
Battles Loom on Earned Income Tax Credit, Consultants Tell Staffers, 
BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY TAX REPORT, Jan. 25, 2013, at G-1. 
232 The California Act authorizes the board in charge of the program and Trust 
to “[d]isseminate information” about these federal tax credits. S.B. 1234, 2012 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100012(e) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
233 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (adding § 100004(c) to the CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
(2012)).  
234 Keegan, supra note 86. 
235 S.B. 1234 (Cal. 2012) (adding §§ 100013, 100014(c)(3), 100036 to the 
CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
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state-sponsored program will conclude that the state which, through its 
pension fund, directs the investment of their retirement savings stands 
behind the investment performance of the state’s own agency.  The 
disclaimer of state liability the California legislature placed in the Act236 
can be eliminated by a future legislature.  There will be greater political 
pressure to cure any future shortfall with tax-generated funds if the 
California’s own pension fund fails to achieve the stated, cash balance-
style return promised to program participants by the board.   
  Even if the California legislature amends the Act to create true 
individual retirement accounts or another state’s legislature modifies 
California’s approach to create such accounts, state pension funds have not 
been without their own problems.237 Moreover, if bona fide individual 
retirement accounts were invested by CALPERs or another state agency, 
some account holders will likely conclude that the state is, at some level, a 
guarantor of adequate investment performance.  
 On the other hand, prominent invoices, including David 
Swenson,238 Professor Forman,239 and Professor Munnell,240 argue that 
rank-and-file employees will never be good investors.  From this premise, 
it is a potentially valuable service for the state to provide to these 
employees state pension plans’ professional investing skills to manage 
                                                         
236 Id. (adding § 100013 to the CAL. GOV’T CODE (2012)). 
237 Peter Lattman, Ex-Chief of Calpers is Charged with Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 19, 2013, at B3; Reuven Fenton and Carl Campanile, Jailbird Hevesi is 
Free Out after 20 Mos,  N.Y. POST, Dec. 13, 2012, at 8; Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Public Pensions’ Unrealistic Rate of Return Assumptions, OUPBLOG (Aug. 6, 
2012, 8:30AM), http://blog.oup.com/2012/08/public-pensions-unrealistic-rate-of-
return-assumptions/; Edward A. Zelinsky, Public Pensions, Private Equity, and the 
Mythical 8% Return, OUPBLOG (March 5, 2012, 8:30AM), 
http://blog.oup.com/2013/03/public-pensions-private-equity-return/. 
238 DAVID F. SWENSEN, UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS: A FUNDAMENTAL 
APPROACH TO PERSONAL INVESTMENT 4 (2005) (“Even with a massive educational 
effort, the likelihood of producing a national of effective investors seems small.”). 
239 Jonathan Barry Forman & Gordon D. Mackenzie, Optimal Rules for 
Defined Contribution Plans: What Can We Learn from the U.S. and Australian 
Pension Systems, 66 TAX LAWYER 613, 633 (2013) (“On average, individual 
workers tend to be pretty poor investors.”). 
240 ALICIA H. MUNNELL, STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS: WHAT NOW 187 (2012) 
(“Since employees shoulder all the risks in a 401(k) system, they have to make 
good decisions for tehse plans to work well. But employees make mistakes at every 
step along the way.”). 
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such employees’ retirement accounts. 
 Here again my personal preference is for state experimentation, 
despite my skepticism about some of the possible experiments.241 A state 
could plausibly mandate that every private employer maintain an 
retirement savings arrangement for its employees (whether a qualified plan 
or a payroll deduction IRA program) without the state itself getting into the 
business of investing private employees’ retirement savings.242 This is the 
approach embodied in President Obama’s proposed employer mandate, 
i.e., employers with more than ten employees would be required to 
maintain retirement plans or IRA savings programs, but there would be no 
public investment vehicle like the California Trust.243  
 The argument for investing retirement funds privately (rather than 
through a public entity like the Trust) is reinforced by both the DOL’s 
recently-adopted regulations requiring fee disclosure244 and soon-to-be 
proposed regulations heightening the fiduciary obligations of investment 
advisors.245 If successful, these regulations should reduce the fees paid by 
pension plans and participants and should better align the interests of 
investment counselors with the interests of these plans and participants.  
The skeptics246 could retort that, even with these desirable changes, most 
employees will never be good investors and thus would benefit from the 
investment services of CalPERS and other professionally-run state pension 
funds.  Different states’ experiments would help determine who is right. 
 Yet a final alternative for a legislature favoring the kind of cash 
                                                         
241 Edward A. Zelinsky, State-Administered Retirement Plans for the Private 
Sector: A Bad Idea, OUPBLOG (May 21, 2008, 12:55 PM), 
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242 See JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 234 (Kathleen 
Courrier et. al. eds., 2006) (“Employers without a retirement plan should be 
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balance formula embodied in the Act would be to mandate that employers 
purchase for their otherwise uncovered employees individual retirement 
annuities247 offered by insurance companies.  State-mandated annuities are 
likely to meet greater popular resistance than state-mandated accounts.  In 
our defined contribution culture, the norm for savings is today based on the 
account model.248 But cultures change and can be changed. 
 A particular interesting variant of the mandatory annuity 
alternative is for the state requiring such annuities to charter a state-
sponsored insurance company to provide annuities.  A state-run company 
could be the exclusive purveyor of annuities for those employees 
participating under the state retirement savings program or the state 
provider of annuities could instead be a TVA-style public option, 
competing against private insurers.  While my personal enthusiasm for this 
possibility is limited, a commitment to Brandeisian experimentation 
implies that I could be surprised. 
 
X.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act is 
important both because of California’s size and status as a trendsetter and 
because the Act targets a pressing problem, the lack of retirement savings 
by low-income workers.  The notional cash balance-style accounts created 
by the Act do not qualify as individual retirement accounts since the 
accounts authorized by the Act create a defined benefit-type, formula-
based claim against a collectively-managed fund.  Under the Code and 
ERISA, individual retirement accounts directly allocate investment gains 
and losses to the individual account holder. 
  The Act could be amended to recast its accounts as true individual 
retirement accounts that assign investment risk and loss directly to the 
account holder.  If so, the Act’s employer mandate and supplemental 
employer contributions should survive ERISA-preemption under Travelers.  
Legality does not equate with wisdom and thus the Act, along with President 
Obama’s proposed federal mandate, should provoke debate about the need 
and best means to encourage greater retirement savings by the less affluent.  
In that debate, I favor state-by-state experimentation rather than any single 
approach to the task of encouraging greater retirement savings.  
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